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THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. MARITIME POWER IN THE PACIFIC
(E.A. Olsen)
Before the Pacific was a gleam in the eye of American or other
Western seafaring nations, bent on commercial or geopolitical
ambitions, the waters off Asia were the domain of several
indigenous seafaring states. These included premodern regimes in
Japan, the East Indies, Malaya, and Indochina. Although these early
states became moderately important locally based on their
proficiency at sea, none of them spread their influence very wide
regionally via seapower. Asian history is marked, instead, by two
major continentalist powers, China and India. To be sure, both
extended their zones of cultural and political influence by sea, as well
as land, but neither were notably expansionist. Moreover, their sea-
borne influence was marginal to their continental presence. Instead,
they functioned as mainland Asian magnets drawing outsiders to
them, or into their orbit, by virtue of their attractions. Thus, the
historical dynamics of Asia, prior to the advent of Westerners, were
much less dependent upon seapower than was true of Europe and
the regions in which Europeans settled.
When Western seafarers first made their way to Asia,
following the lures described and exaggerated by earlier overland
travelers, they went in search of greatness and wealth in certain
more advanced civilizations. In time, however, this changed
dramatically, as Western societies advanced materially and key
Asian societies remained on a relative plateau. Over the decades
Western seapower became the main instrument of Western
imperialism, spreading European power and influence through what
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(from the westernmost peninsulas of Eurasia) was considered the
Near, Middle, and Far East. The most powerful European rivalries
found expression in Asia as the British, French, Dutch, and
Portuguese spread their reach from their homelands through
seapower. Only the Czarist Russians relied primarily on continental
expansionism, using seapower around the fringes of empire.
American Role
Americans were decided latecomers to all this. After the
Revolutionary War, Americans found themselves free of the British
Navigation Acts which had restricted their overseas trade options.
At the same time, however, a British "Order in Council," of 2 July
1783, prohibited American access to markets in the West Indies.
These concurrent developments led Americans to seek new markets,
and they looked especially to the Orient. Led by the Empress of
China, out of New York (in 1783), this created a thriving trade
between the Northeast U.S. coast and China. When Americans
appeared on the East Asian scene as ex-colonials from the New
World, they were small parts of a larger scheme which they did not
control. Nor did they exert much influence upon that system.
Nonetheless, many of them prospered in ways that whetted their
appetite both for complete American trade autonomy and for a
larger American share of the riches Asia offered to the West.
Consequently, the American stake in Asia across the far Pacific to
their West is not a modern phenomenon. It is virtually as old as the
United States.
It is for this reason that one can say, despite its relatively late
arrival, that the United States has a long maritime tradition in the
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Pacific. From the age of far-flung American merchant ships under
sail (the late-1700s to mid-1800s) to the massive carrier groups of the
1990s, American vessels have made their presence known in Asia-
Pacific waters. That span of years and diversity of ships marked an
evolutionary process that continues unabated. As the United States
faces the 21st century from the vantage point as the preeminent
naval power in the contemporary world, and to some Americans as a
unipolar power,! it is worth assessing the nature of the evolution of
U.S. maritime power in the Pacific and analyzing the prospects for
U.S. Naval power in the Pacific in the coming century.
Although most Americans have tended to be oriented toward
Europe throughout U.S. history, because of cultural ties to the "old
country" and the preeminence of Europe in world affairs, that did
not prevent the development of important commercial links between
Americans and Asians. The China clipper trade routes of the 1840s
were major maritime avenues for American business.^ Those
vessels, in turn, sought safety as they plied the Pacific. The U.S.
Navy's initial limited abilities to help fend for the American merchant
fleet compelled merchants to fend for themselves and, whenever
possible, take advantage of the protection afforded to American
merchant vessels by the freedom of the seas maintained by the Royal
Navy. Americans did not have a choice regarding a world
dominated by Pax Britannica; it was the ineluctable global context of
the day. Thus, despite the animosities of immediate post-
revolutionary war years, Americans retained a de facto Anglophone
orientation in Pacific trade routes. This is not to say that British and
American merchantmen were partners in exploiting the "riches of the
East," for in fact they were competitors. Nonetheless, as English
speakers from an upstart new nation, the Americans gravitated
toward the fringes of the patterns established by their British
predecessors. This meant that they had little access in South Asian
areas solidly controlled by the British Empire, but were able to follow
in the wake of that Empire's merchants and navy in Far Eastern
regions of Asia where no single power dominated. In effect, the
early American merchantmen in Asia were classic free-riders on the
fringes of the British Empire. This relative regional emphasis
established a pattern which persists to this day, in which Americans
show far more interest in Eastern Asia than in Southern Asia, with
Southeast Asia falling in between.
As the United States grew, however, and the numbers of
American merchant vessels traversing the Pacific also expanded, this
created a need for the U.S. Navy to increase its ability to provide
protection for the private merchant fleet. Thus, it is important to
note, in light of 20th century developments, that the U.S. Navy did
not lead the way into the Pacific in order to provide stable conditions
for American commerce, but was, instead, drawn into the region in
order to secure such conditions for already established American
commercial interests. In other words, the flag followed trade.
Following this sequence of events it is interesting to note that the
U.S. Navy, which had cut its teeth in two struggles against the Royal
Navy (i.e., the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812), nonetheless
had to follow a course which the fledgling U.S. merchant marine had
established. The U.S. Navy was at that time far too small to even
think about providing "freedom of the seas" for the American
merchant vessels. Moreover, that role was the self-proclaimed
mission of the Royal Navy which clearly ruled the waves in all areas
of the world where the Empire's influence was felt. Since the
American merchant fleet was still free-riding in the shadows of the
British Empire when the U.S. Navy started to show the U.S. flag, it
became natural for the American Navy to also follow in their wake.
Thus, without any foreordained plan, the United States Navy began
to play roles which supported the overall free-riding desires of
American merchantmen. This meant that, in effect, the U.S. Navy
played a supplementary role in the wake of the Royal Navy
whenever the commercial interests of the United States and the
British Empire overlapped. This pattern was intensified by the
relative ease of American commercial penetration in areas where
British speakers of English had already blazed a trail and where the
indigenous peoples scarcely understood the difference between
British and Americans, and to whom they looked and sounded alike.
This defacto supporting role was the general pattern, but from
the earliest days of American naval involvement in Asia the United
States Navy carved out specific missions for itself as the Navy
engaged in rescues and limited flag-showing operations. These
grew in scope, magnitude, and number throughout the mid-19th
century. Although the U.S. Navy was still dwarfed by the Royal
Navy and clearly understood the latters' primacy, American
warships carved out a much larger role in defense of U.S.
commercial interests in the Pacific. By far the best example of this
new assertiveness was the role played in July 1853 by Commodore
Perry's Eastern Squadron in the U.S. intervention into Japan's
sakoku (closed country) policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate .3 By that
point in American involvement in Asian affairs, the United States
had become a genuine, if small, commercial and naval presence in
the region. Although a rival of the British and other empires, the
Americans nonetheless looked upon their British counterparts as
mentors of sorts. While the United States had not yet developed
imperial ambitions, American commercial and naval protagonists in
the region clearly wanted for the United States some of the rewards
which pursuit of empire had earned for the British. So, even though
they lacked a formal imperial game plan, Americans followed the
British examples. When it benefitted the Americans commercially
and militarily, they were free-riders upon the Empire. When they
saw opportunities to strike out on their own and get an edge on the
European competition, they did not hesitate to do so. The United
States at that time behaved (in a different context) remarkably like
some of the junior strategic partners in Asia which Americans
complained about in the 1970s and '80s.
The United States' intervention into Japan's isolation
originally had relatively modest motives, namely to protect U.S.
merchant ships from dangers in Japan and to provide transit access
enroute to China for resupply. Japan was not then considered a vital
area for commercial penetration. China had been, and remained,
the main lure for Westerners in Eastern Asia. Japan was an
interesting sideshow to the main event. Hence, though Americans
faced competition in Japan from the British and the Russians,
everyone's main interests remained in China. This made it relatively
easy for Americans to maximize the gains they made by being the
first to "open" Japan. Based on those advantages, the American
commercial and naval presence in the Western Pacific began to
assume true viability. Reinforced by territorial expansion into the
mid-Pacific when Americans gradually absorbed Hawaii into U.S.
domains from 1887-1900, and by the aquisition of a short-lived naval
base in Samoa in 1878, the still young United States was enroute to
becaming a Pacific country in ways that was not true of the major
Western empires.^ In that sense Americans saw themselves as
pursuing national territorial interests rather than imperialist
colonial interests. This may not have made any difference to those
Asians and Pacific islanders on the receiving end of U.S. commercial
and naval interests, but it mattered to Americans who — while riding
in the wake of imperialists and sometimes acting like them — often
considered themselves to have higher motives. This dichotomy was
best displayed in 1899 when the United States pursued its "open
door" policies vis-a-vis China. Ostensibly designed to help the
Chinese remain free of domination by any single foreign power and
to maximize free access to the "great China market," it would never
have worked if it had not also served British imperial purposes. This
was a clear example of the American flag, and a bold U.S. policy
initiative, piggybacking on the presence of the dominant Western
power in the region.
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New Horizons
Regardless of the exaggerated influence of the United States in
the Pacific at a time when most Americans remained preoccupied
with development of their vast continental domain, these distant
developments whetted the American appetite for an expanded
7
horizon further west than the United States' Pacific coast. A sizeable
minority of vocal Americans called for the creation of an imperial
mandate for the United States that would put their country into the
same leagues as those powers which dominated world affairs in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.^ The Pacific, along with Latin
American, seemed to be the most appropriate venues for this
imperialist ambition. Two events accelerated these aspirations. The
Spanish-American War created opportunities after 1898 for the
United States to create a colony in the Pacific at the expense of the
Philippines.7 More abstractly, the United States also produced a
theoretician for this burgeoning agenda. Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan, from his vantage point at the Naval War College, became
the U.S. Navy's most prominent theoretician of sea power by
partially addressing his thesis to these contemporary issues in the
Pacific.8 Although most of Mahan's writings dealt with other
regions, he was prescient in noting, "it may even be questioned
whether sound military policy may not make the Pacific rather than
the Atlantic the station for the United States battle fleet."9
This development proved to have profound implications for
both the United States Navy as an institution and for the U.S. Navy
as an instrument of American policy in the Pacific. Mahan reshaped
the Navy's sense of itself and of its potentials versus the navies of
other countries, notably the Royal Navy in whose shadow it had so
long dwelled in the Pacific. As important, Mahan enhanced
American understanding of the ability of U.S. seapower to transform
the United States into a genuine major power that thought of itself
primarily as a maritime power as compared to a continental power.
8
Mahan's writings exposed Americans to the diversity of their
options. They could remain a growing continental state whose
enormous inner strengths required off-shore naval defenses, or they
could use continental strength to create a naval instrument capable
of projecting American power and influence far afield. Admiral
Mahan's writings guided the United States toward an appreciation
for naval power which helped to transform the role of the United
States in international affairs generally and in the Pacific,
specifically.
When one looks back from the late 20th century at Mahan's
influence upon the development of the U.S. Navy from 1890s to the
early 20th century, it is too easy to cast him as a distant historical
figure who is not considered by most contemporary Naval officers to
be a major present-day influence on their profession. Virtually all
U.S. Navy officers know who Mahan was, most have read excerpts
from his classic tome, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, and
many vaguely think of him the way they do John Paul Jones, as one of
the U.S. Navy's "founding fathers." Nonetheless, Mahan usually is
treated as a distinctly historical figure. 10
For all of Mahan's quaintness in the nuclear age, his quest for
an emphasis upon seapower within the international policy of the
growing United States of his day bears a legacy which is often
slighted by his professional descendents. Mahan was simultaneously
a product of a fledgling imperialist phase in U.S. history and a
booster for that phase. When Mahan argued for increased naval
power, which would in turn sustain militarily the economic
conditions for the support of sizeable naval forces, he advocated a
symbiotic relationship that was profoundly imperialist and
mercantilist. Thus the expansion of U.S. naval power with which
Mahan is identified, and which eventually put the U.S. Navy into the
major leagues of global naval powers, had a distinct imperialist
impetus.
The Mahanian thrust of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific quickly
ran into the reality of running a colony in the Philippines. The
transformation of the United States from a country which gloried in
its anti-colonial revolutionary traditions into an active colonialist
was not a simple one. Resistance to the change in policy was
substantial and the sentiment in the U.S. Congress in favor of such a
shift was paper thin. Nonetheless, as a territorially expansionist
state which wondered what might replace its receding frontiers as
an incentive for progress, in an age when international social
Darwinism seemed logical, and when an imperialist balance of
power constituted the rules of the game, enough Americans wanted
a piece of the imperialist action for the United States, for them to
carry the day in U.S. policy debates. The Spanish-American War and
the opportunities it created in the Philippine islands for Americans to
join in the "great game" at the turn of the century were too
promising to pass up. Part and parcel of this era was the creation of
what came to be known as "the Great White Fleet" that could
demonstrate an American presence in the Pacific (1908) and the
"carry a big stick" philosophy of Teddy Roosevelt which lay behind
it. 11 In short, the then growing U.S. Navy came to symbolize a new
degree of American swagger internationally.
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U.S. Caution
The armed struggle against Philippine nationalists, in what
Americans perceived as an insurrection but Filipinos accurately
consider part of their revolutionary experience, quickly soured many
Americans on the ineluctable by-products of imperialism. Americans
wanted the fruits and status of being a major power in an imperialist
age, but were much less willing to behave like ruthless imperialists.
Although the United States prevailed over the less prepared
Filipinos, the costs of doing so were high. In circumstances that in
certain ways foreshadowed the "Vietnam syndrome" of the 1970s
and '80s, the rigors of suppressing Filipinos took the edge off
American desires for further imperialist exploits in the pre-Second
World War period. American enthusiasm cooled further as the more
powerful colonial powers in Asia, and certain non-colonized states
(notably Japan), began to treat the United States differently. To be
sure, through their imperialism Americans earned a place at the
international table, that was enhanced by U.S. participation in the
First World War, but it also generated suspicion of U.S. motives and
cynicism about American claims to hewing to higher standards. As a
consequence, the years leading up to the Second World War
witnessed an equally dramatic partial reversal in U.S. policy.
Americans reverted to their longstanding isolationist traditions in
terms of focusing on domestic affairs while largely limiting foreign
military entanglements. The three major exceptions to that general
rule were: 1) recurring interventionism in Latin America (where the
Monroe Doctrine guided American thinking and acting), 2) consistent
interest in foreign trade opportunities that were considered
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offshoots of domestic economic activities and not deemed
"entanglements," and 3) the continued maintenance of sizeable naval
forces.
The United States developed its navy based on one implied
imperialist mentor-model as it rode in the wake of the Royal Navy,
and on one explicitly imperialist vision developed by Admiral
Mahan. Nonetheless, Washington facilely reordered its naval
priorities as Americans rediscovered their isolationist/non-
interventionist proclivities. As part of a general disillusionment with
the efficacy of war, and the need to prepare for it perpetually, the
American people experienced after the First World War what Harold
and Margaret Sprout called a "popular revolt against navalism."12
During the 1920s and '30s Americans decided that the best use for a
navy which the United States had developed in order to join the
imperialist club was, perversely, to help insulate the United States
behind the natural oceanic walls it enjoyed. In short, the U.S. Navy
that Mahan had advocated so that the United States could become a
player in world affairs found its interwar purpose as a protector of
American isolationism. In contrast to the U.S. Army which in the
interwar years again reverted to the peacetime cadre status which
had been normal for the United States prior to the post-World War
Two creation of seemingly permanent large-scale standing forces,
the U.S. Navy found a distinct — if unwanted — identity in the
isolationist years of the 1920s and '30s. This proved easier in the
Atlantic where the Royal Navy's strength buffered the East Coast
defenses of the United States, but in the Pacific Americans were
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compelled by their mid-Pacific territorial outpost to preserve the
neutrality of adjacent waters without major external assistance.
Moreover, the United States' fervent interwar desire to avoid
becoming entangled in the old world's problems again led to new
forms of naval utility. Since the other major foreign and indigenous
powers in the Pacific all based their prowess on naval armaments,
maintaining the balance of power in the region was a maritime
affair. When the rough imperial equilibrium, dominated by the
British, was disturbed by the rising geopolitical aspirations of post-
First World War Japan, which were met by refusal of the Western
powers to accept Japan's claim to an equal seat at the international
table, Tokyo faced the prospect of increasing its military and naval
strength in ways that would compel Westerners to accept Japan on
its own terms. That agenda appealed to some Japanese, but caused
others to question the wisdom of a confrontational response.
Especially during the economic prosperity of the 1920s, this
alternative seemed wasteful. In order to defuse the situation and to
help assure peace in the Pacific which was ideal for preserving
American neutrality, Washington -- guided by prominent advocates
of naval arms control such as Senator Borah of Idaho — took the
lead in the series of negotiations labeled the Washington
Conferences of 1921-22.13 a key product of those negotiations was a
set of preemptive restrictions on a looming naval arms race. The
U.S. Navy, thereby, became a vital chesspiece in a skillful diplomatic
game. Naval arms control in the Pacific was a basic element in
preserving American neutrality. Though both "isolationism" and
"naval arms control" became virtually taboo subjects during the
13
subsequent cold war years, it is nonetheless true that each theme was
important in prewar U.S. policy and that for many years they
worked.
The arms control regime in the pre-war Pacific did not end
with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Even as Tokyo used maritime
restrictions to keep Western countries at a distance, and vice versa (it
is important to note), Japan by the late 1920s and early '30s was
enroute to strengthening its ground forces for eventual use on the
Asian mainland. While a harbinger of what was to come, none of
that maneuvering violated agreements with the Western states in
Asia. Westerners had not paid sufficient attention to the inter-Asian
side of the Pacific power balance. Japan's naval arms control
agreements worked to its advantage because it kept the Royal and
U.S. Navies from becoming proximate threats to Japan and allowed
monies Tokyo did not spend on a naval arms race to be devoted to
defense-industrial and ground force purposes. Though Japan cut a
few minor corners in the naval arms control agreements, on balance,
Tokyo kept its word and did not engage in a serious naval build-up
until after the naval treaties had been allowed to lapse according to
their legal provisions. By that time global economic depression put
an initial crimp in all countries' desires for an arms race. That
inhibition persisted in some countries, notably the United States
which clung still more fervently to its oceanic buffers, but others -
Germany and Japan — used an arms build-up to jump start their
weakened economies.
The growth of fascist European and Asian military power
severely tested American will to remain neutral. American
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isolationism was predicated on a desire not to become entangled in
old world conflicts. Such conflicts were considered traps that
Americans should avoid, lest they become pointlessly entangled in
what a later generation of Americans called a quagmire. The "Great
War," as the First World War was then known, generated
considerable cynicism and wariness among Americans who -- having
violated their principles on behalf of a "war to end all wars" —
discovered after the fact that it was merely the largest of a series of
old world conflagrations. The United States' role in victory in the
Great War had not stopped the recurrent cycles of war and peace
and renewed preparation to fight again. As the various peace and
arms control conferences produced regulatory regimes that could
only work when all parties wanted them to work, Americans
retrenched behind their protective oceanic borders, relieved to be in
the distant Western Hemisphere and determined to stay out of the
old world's problems. Nonetheless, the combination of changing
military technology which made the oceans metaphorically shrink
and, more importantly, the growth of liberal internationalism
among some Americans put a crack in American isolationist armor.
Concerns grew among Americans that fascist regimes in
Germany, Italy, and Spain would endanger two groups that certain
Americans valued. Some Americans feared the consequences for
progressive socialists in Europe. This was at a time in U.S. history
when a profound debate was occurring over the ability of capitalism
to lift the United States out of the Great Depression. Consequently
the American left, broadly defined, felt empathy for their European
counterparts who were endangered by the growth of fascist military
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power. Other Americans felt sympathy for a very different segment
of Europe as Nazi armed aggression conquered some countries and
threatened others, from which many Americans had descended. This
became particularly acute vis-a-vis Great Britain. As a consequence
of these anxieties, American steadfastness as a neutral was
stretched. As the foreign wars escalated, American neutrality was
manipulated in creative ways by the Roosevelt administration, much
to the consternation of American conservatives who accused FDR of
being duped by the left, by ethnic activists, and by British imperialists
into steps that would entangle the United States in a war that he had
promised to avoid.
Impact of Second World War
Though virtually none of this escalation of U.S. concerns had
involved the Pacific, where Japan's aggression against China,
Manchuria, and the Soviet Union was widely publicized, it was in
the Pacific that the United States would be drawn into the war it had
so ardently tried to avoid. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
crystallized instantly for virtually all Americans, the need for a U.S.
response. Although some critics subsequently expressed suspicions
that American pressures on Japan, in conjunction with Western
imperial powers, may have induced the Pearl Harbor attack as a way
to ease American entry into the European conflict that was of greater
concern to more Americans, such complaints had little impact and
were overtaken by events. What mattered for most Americans was
that the war had been brought to American territory. The assault on
Hawaii shattered the American sense of distance from a conflict that
was engulfing so many other parts of the world. Equally significant,
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the vulnerability of the United States' naval buffer for its neutrality
had been exposed by the devastating nature of the damage inflicted
on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
There is no need in this analysis to attempt a survey of the role
of the U.S. Navy in the Second World War that then unfolded for
Americans, in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. That history is
too well known to require further elaboration here.14 Nonetheless,
the impact of that war on the U.S. Navy's long term role in Asia-
Pacific affairs is worth assessing. Virtually overnight, the Pacific
changed from an area of tension notable for a kind of deterrence
between the Japanese Empire on the one hand, and an array of
Western countries on the other, into a battle zone with a radically
altered geopolitical calculus. Though rumors of an expanded war
were rife, many assumed the Japanese were prudent enough not to
precipitously risk taking the naval battle to the Westerners before
Tokyo had solidified its continental gains. Even though Great
Britain's troubles on the home front diverted the Royal Navy, its
aura still loomed large in the Pacific. Similarly, the sleeping giant
image of the United States was well understood in Asia. In fact,
despite its neutrality, the United States actually loomed largest
among Western states in the Pacific. As the Japanese attacks on
Hawaii and in Southeast Asia demonstrated, however, such imagery
was not enough to deter Tokyo from taking a risk which almost
succeeded. In short order, the U.S. Navy saw its role change from a
buffer, and bargaining piece, into the overt vanguard of the West in
Asia. Partly thanks to Japanese propaganda, and partly due to the
reality of a sudden realization that the other Western powers were
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no longer as capable as the United States of maintaining a
significant presence in the Pacific as their homelands were torn by
war, the U.S. Navy instantly formed the core of the region's non-
Asian resistance to the Japanese.
In stark contrast to Europe where Americans again joined
other Westerners in a diversified effort to throw back fascist
advances at sea, but mainly on land, in the Pacific the battle was
overwhelmingly maritime as far as Americans were concerned. To
be sure, the land battles between Japan and China were a major
factor in Japan's war (as was Germany's Eastern Front with the
Soviet Union in that theater), but the American view of each theater
was naturally more parochial. From the outset, therefore,
Americans treated the Pacific as a maritime theater and an
"American" theater. This did not sit well with some in the U.S. Army
and some U.S. allies ~ notably the Brits, Aussies, and Kiwis -- but
they eventually had to face the reality that such American
perceptions were accurate when juxtaposed to the diversification of
the European part of the war. Perhaps the best evidence for this was
the profoundly maritime-oriented manner in which a U.S. Army
General, Douglas MacArthur, coordinated the conduct of the Pacific
War.
Equally striking was the way in which American leaders in the
Second World War decided to emphasize the European theater.
Even though it was an attack from Asia which brought the United
States out of its neutrality, and American forces in the Pacific had
borne the initial casualities, American responses after war was
declared were schizophrenic. Instead of focusing on the source of the
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attack and resolving the immediate problem, Americans opted to
emphasize what most people in the United States prior to the war
considered to be the greater long term danger. The war in the Pacific
was made a secondary priority until the European theater had been
resolved.
In both respects the United States set precedents that were to
have lasting influence for decades to come. The United States
moved toward making the Pacific what many have considered an
American 'lake.' Despite such new regional primacy, the United
States simultaneously made clear that U.S. national interests
dictated an emphasis upon European affairs and a conscious decision
to put the Asia-Pacific region second as a priority. As far as the U.S.
Navy's role in the Pacific was concerned this was a good news/bad
news proposition. The Second World War propelled the U.S. Navy
into a level of overt regional importance that it had never
experienced previously. It openly supplanted the Royal Navy. At
first this appeared to be a temporary arrangement, but by the end of
the war the combination of a staggering increase in U.S. Naval
power and the marked decline of the British Empire's clout had made
it clear that the transfer of naval power was not temporary. By
vanquishing the Imperial Japanese Navy, and with no credible
Western rival, the U.S. Navy truly ruled the waves in the Pacific. A
naval Pax Britannica had been replaced by a naval Pax Americana .
Though the U.S. Navy's role in the Atlantic also increased markedly,
it was substantially offset by the continued presence of the Royal and
other Western navies, and — even more — by the preeminence of
ground forces in that theater. Therefore, in the course of World War
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Two, the U.S. Navy's Pacific role overwhelmingly dwarfed its
relative roles elsewhere. On the other side of the coin, however, the
Pacific remained throughout an afterthought for most Americans. It
never became the key theater until after V-E Day, and even then had
to compete for Washington's attention with the great concern
Americans expressed for post-war European recovery.
Had it not been for the nuclear attacks on Japan, this relative
emphasis might have changed. If extensive ground warfare had
been necessary by Western forces in China, Manchuria, the Far
Eastern portions of the Soviet Union, Korea, and the Japanese home
islands in order to subdue the Japanese Empire, the American image
of the Pacific war would by very different today. Those terrible new
weapons foreshortened that war and reinforced the maritime
interpretation just outlined by enabling Americans to avoid truly
extensive ground combat in Asia. Consequently, at the end of the
war the United States (and its navy) found itself in the cat-bird's seat
vis-a-vis the Pacific, but had not altered the overall American view
of the Asia-Pacific region as of far less relative importance compared
to Europe.
Lest those circumstances suggest the Pacific was a backwater,
it must also be stressed that the Second World War's disruption of
American neutralist-isolationist proclivities reshaped the United
States' strategic worldview. Whereas internationalism had once
been an aspersion cast by conservatives, in the course of the war
many of those conservatives foresook the legacy of the founding
fathers and became converts to collective security. For virtually an
entire generation of Americans the "Munich syndrome" denoting
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appeasement of aggressive states became an object lesson from
which they refused to waver. This, in turn, infused an appreciation
for the importance of distant regions of the world to the global
security consciousness which emerged in wartime America as it
evolved into a world power. By the end of that war, when the
United States had arguably become the sole world power, the
globalist worldview with international responsibilities had sunk
deep roots among many more Americans than had been true on the
eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This new mindset was
tremendously important for the Asia-Pacific region because it found
itself elevated to unprecedented importance in the minds of
American elites. It clearly ranked behind Europe, but it also was
firmly ahead of regions of the world that ranked third or lower.
Being of secondary importance to the United States in the emerging
postwar era was not only a major step up in relative terms compared
to prewar neutrality, it also represented a very high level of intrinsic
ascribed value in American eyes. Having played the main role in
Japan's defeat (with due apologies to China's role, it would not have
prevailed absent the United States), Americans felt they had
inherited a set of responsibilities for the peace and stability of the
region.
Postwar Pacific Strategy
The importance of this new U.S. relationship with Asia for the
U.S. Navy cannot be overrated. If the postwar Pacific was an
American lake, the U.S. Navy was by default the guardian of that
'lake.' It had virtually no competition. In the early postwar period
the Royal Navy still had pretentions to "ruling the waves" in the
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region, but they quickly proved hollow as the once great British
Empire began to crumble around it. No other naval power was
remotely in the same league as the United States. Ironically, the U.S.
Navy which had been compelled to forego the ambitions cultivated
by Admiral Mahan's imperialism in the name of interwar neutrality,
now found itself more powerful than even Mahan had imagined by
virtue of having fought a war against Asian imperialism. Therefore
a navy which received its first major institutional boost from an
American variant of imperialism can be seen as the beneficiary of an
anti-imperialist impulse.
Compounding the irony, the U.S. Navy's new-found role of
temporary policeman of the Pacific soon took on proportions that —
in the eyes of many Asians — toyed with imperialism again. In the
immediate postwar period, the United States was firm in its anti-
colonialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-fascist demeanor. This is best
seen in the American rush to dispose of the United States' colony in
the Philippines. It also is clearly seen in the American effort to rid
Asia of the remnants of Japanese colonialism (i.e. in Korea,
Manchuria, and Taiwan) and imperialism (i.e. in China and
Southeast Asia). As these efforts were progressing, however, two
parallel events occurred. As part of the primary focus on European
recovery, the United States confronted the dilemma created by the
argument of some Europeans that they needed to retain their
colonies if the central state was to maximize its chances for success.
In tandem with this development, cold war tensions materialized
between the United States and the nascent Soviet bloc in a manner
that reinforced European colonial arguments vis-a-vis Asia and
22
raised concerns in Washington about the United States' position as
the defacto sole safeguard against a geopolitical vacuum in the
Western Pacific. Americans feared that communist gains being made
in Eastern Europe and China would spread like a cancer throughout
Asia.
As a result of these circumstances the United States, and the
U.S. Navy as its main military instrument in the region, soon found
itself in an unexpected and unwanted position. Instead of wrapping
up the liberation of former Japanese-controlled territories as quickly
as had been hoped, dealing with occupied Japan as a discrete and
finite problem, and demobilizing most of the United States' armed
forces for a long-term peace, American postwar power made it the
logical nexus of the forces which rejected communism as an
alternative. The anti-communist thrust of postwar American
ideology yielded an odd mixture of approaches. To prevent a
vacuum from developing that Marxist revolutionaries might fill, the
United States hedged its anti-colonialist preferences. Americans did
fulfill their commitment to Philippine independence, but Washington
was less resolute when it came to opposing the return of British,
French, and Dutch colonialists to the Southeast Asian domains that
had been taken from them by wartime Japanese efforts to rid Asia of
Western control. At the time it seemed prudent to go slow in these
matters, politically sanction the necessity of European colonial
reentry into Southeast Asia, and militarily provide the cover under
which these options could occur. Though less heavy-handed, U.S.
policy toward Korean independence from Japan also tilted toward
the seemingly assured stability of the most conservative of the
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available political options in the American-controlled half of Korea.
In keeping with this conservative anti-communist tilt, the United
States' policy toward occupied Japan also shifted toward an effort to
use the ample human skills and conservative political proclivities of
the recently defeated enemy as the basis for creating a nascent U.S.-
Japan bulwark against communist expansionism in Asia.
In short, Americans in Asia were fleshing out a regional version
of the containment doctrine which Washington devised to cope with
Moscow's ambitions in Western Eurasia. There was considerable
irony in the conservative themes that ran through this agenda
because these themes called upon anti-communist conservative
Americans to remain active participants in postwar collective
security. Such activism amounted to volunteering for precisely the
entangling alliances which Americans, since Washington and
Jefferson, had disavowed.
Almost as important, the ways in which U.S. containment
policy for postwar Asia required the U.S. Navy to become an active
instrument of U.S. policy through routine forward deployments
marked a radical departure for a branch of the U.S. armed forces
which previously had been so closely identified with conservative
isolationism and noninterventionism. The reasons for this switch in
orientation within the Pacific was only partly due to the overall
ideological shift in U.S. policy that stemmed from events in Europe.
It had more to do with the ways in which cold war geopolitics
fostered the doctrine of containment. Behind that doctrine was an
extensive literature predicated on the dynamic tension between a
powerful country in the "heartland" of Eurasia (as described
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variously by Mackinder and Haushofer^) and a network of
countries or colonial territories strung out around the edges of
Eurasia, which Spykmann labelled the "rimland."16 These ways of
conceptualizing the balance of power around the main territorial
and population centers of the world meshed well with the seapower
notions of Mahan and the airpower notions of de Severskyl? and
Mitchell^. For decades the geopolitical and diplomatic "great
game" had been waged between rival European centers of power
with the upstart Japanese as an outsider. Although dressed in
modern garb, this was precisely the cyclical quagmire from which the
United States had chosen to abstain.
Strategic Priorities
Americans appreciated seapower, but -- until the 1940s —
visualized it primarily as an agent of stability that the Royal Navy
would provide to keep the global balance intact. The Second World
War upset the equilibrium and thrust the U.S. Navy into an
approximation of the role the Royal Navy had played for so long.
Without an overt effort to switch roles that would have been an
affront to the Royal Navy, and which probably would not have been
well accepted by most Americans who rejected the idea that the
United States had fought World War Two to make the world safe for
the revival of colonialism, a transferral nonetheless occurred. The
Royal Navy gradually faded into a supportive role and the U.S.
Navy took the lead. While this was evident in most sectors around
the Eurasian continent (South Asia being a temporary exception), it
was most transparently obvious in the Western Pacific where the
U.S. Navy ran the show.
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Despite the apparent and real parallels between the prewar
Royal Navy and the postwar role of the U.S. Navy, there was a
fundamental difference which was crucial. For the British, as it was
for the Americans in most of the 19th century, commercial imperial
motives guided the extension of naval interests. In other words, the
flag usually followed trade and when it did not, and led the way
instead, there was a clear commercial agenda behind the effort to
show the flag. In these terms the former roles of the Royal Navy and
the U.S. Navy were an aberration from the geopolitical grand
designs that evolved from theories spun by Mackinder et al.
Geopolitics from the late 19th century through World War Two
described a strategic environment that was rather abstract. Control
of the "heartland" and/or the "rimland" was not necessarily
predicated on the economic factors that control of territory implied
but because of their explicit military utility in a spatial sense.
Postwar American ideas of containment, and especially the naval
portion of containment around the rimland through the use of
seapower, deviated sharply from the former commercial motives
and hewed to the much more narrow strategic interpretation that
grew out of geopolitics. In this sense it also bore similarities to
Mahan's views. From all these threads, a maritime-oriented
national strategic perspective was created for a North American
'island' that emphatically put military strategy and tactics first and
commercial economic relations second, at best. American leaders
understood the importance of trade for national well being, of
course, but like Mahan they saw it as a symbiotic interplay in which a
safe and secure geopolitical environment that could be assured
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through seapower, was a precondition for the levels of economic
prosperity necessary to sustain naval forces capable of securing
freedom of the seas.
The cold war years, therefore, are marked by a profound
emphasis on military and ideological themes within U.S. national
security strategy, with economic themes playing subordinate and
derivative roles. This carried over into U.S. naval strategy, as part
of the national strategy. Whether in the Atlantic or Pacific, the
American Navy during the 1940s, '50s, '60s, 70s, and '80s fulfilled
roles and missions that were overwhelmingly militarily motivated.
There was virtually no instance of American merchants, bankers, or
investors calling upon the Defense Department generically, and the
U.S. Navy, specifically to make regions of the world safe for their
economic activity. 19 To the extent commercial concerns entered into
American strategic calculations they were phrased in terms of the
ways American forces could preserve peace and stability in a given
area of the world to facilitate the initial economic recovery of certain
states and their continued prosperity once they had regained their
economic viability. In the early and middle years of the cold war such
commercial concerns were present, but they were cast in a decidedly
strategic framework. That is, U.S. strategy was not derived from a
perceived need to foster economic well-being for its own merits, but
because there was a military need for viable economic entities in
certain regions whose prosperity would serve U.S. strategic
interests.
The key features in these priorities were that they were
determined by military-oriented U.S. strategists, most directly
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served the commercial interests of foreign firms (not American), and
were pitched to the U.S. private sector as part of the cost of being a
good global citizen which should eventually reward the American
taxpayer through the benefits to the United States of being the
strategic cornerstone of a growing international trading network.
This approach was more tangible in postwar Europe where the
Marshall Plan had implicit and explicit links with American
conservatives' newly cultivated enthusiasm for internationalism.
Americans had humanitarian reasons for supporting the Marshall
Plan, but the United States also stood to gain economically if Europe
revived, worked closely with a prosperous America, and jointly
defended from the Bolsheviks the Atlanticist's vision of the "world"
that mattered. In this grand design the U.S. defense establishment
played the role of a foundation upon which the plans for a cold war
alliance of politically and economically free nations would be
developed. The U.S. Navy played an important role in those
activities, but not uniquely important. In Europe it had to share the
limelight with the U.S. Army and Air Force. Because of the true
centrality of the "Central Front" in the cold war, this theater always
was consciously joint but was just as consciously acknowledged to be
guided by Army concerns. It was no accident that the top
commanders in Europe have come from the U.S. Army, not the
Navy.
In the Pacific the scene was different. There was no equivalent
of the Marshall Plan. The main reason for this was the Atlanticist
tradition among key U.S. decisionmakers. Even when they were
motivated by prewar isolationist sentiments U.S. officials
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acknowledged that Europe was the nexus of the modern world.
During the Second World War, the European priorities were clear.
These carried forward into the cold war and the Marshall Plan. The
Asia-Pacific region, even in a fairly well defined and markedly
elevated second rank position, enjoyed none of that attention. The
ostensible, and partly valid, reason for this hierarchy, was the
American fear that Europe was the ripest plum. Only Japan, in all of
Asia, approximated such a tempting morsel for Soviet aggression.
In this context, it was difficult, if not impossible, to make a
persuasive case that the Asia-Pacific region enjoyed remotely the
level of potential that Europe did or that there was much in Asia
which would warrant American commercial attention in the early
postwar years. This made the military-oriented strategic argument
intrinsically more powerful in the Pacific. Any commercial rewards
for pursuing this strategy were assumed to be very long run indeed.
While there was some farsighted U.S. commercial interest in Asia,
pegged to Japan's eventual revival and fantasies of the "Great
China Market" which long had lured Westerners to the Far East,
they were dwarfed by postwar American economic interest in
Europe. As important, there was no American groundswell of
commercial pressure upon the U.S. Government to go make the
Asia-Pacific region safe for American trade and investment.
Seapower & Asian Ground Wars
Accentuating the differences, the Pacific remained throughout
the postwar years a U.S. Navy operation. American experiences on
the ground militarily in Asia were not happy ones. In Korea,
Americans learned what limited war in the nuclear age really was
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like and they did not enjoy the experience. The Korean stalemate
was far from the victory thai Americans thought was their due if
they put forth the proper effort. That ground war was a deviation
from the United States' then fledgling postwar maritime strategy in
the Pacific. The semi-permanent U.S. ground commitment in Korea
after the 1953 truce proved to be a NATO-like exception to the
maritime role in the Pacific. That exception also was characterized
by the U.S. Army's tendency to prepare for European wars, but then
fight them in Asia. It had done so in World War Two by necessity,
and in Korea because the Korean civil war was an unanticipated
contingency. Having emerged from that conflict shaken by the
political realities of nuclear escalation and by a close call regarding a
full scale ground war with China's massive forces, Americans
generally concluded that ground wars in Asia should be avoided.
Despite those lessons, Americans were scarcely more prepared to
cope with the next Asian war they were drawn into.
The Vietnam War's story is a complicated one for Americans.
Bitterness and frustrations were widespread in its wake. There are
many versions of why the United States did not succeed. Without
denigrating the roles played by the U.S. Navy at sea and in the air
during that war, there have been no accusations that it lost the
Vietnam War. It was lost either on the ground, in Washington, or in
the American public's mind, depending upon whose interpretation
one accepts.20 it was not the U.S. Navy's war to win or lose. The
point here is not to cast blame, but to point out that Vietnam, like
Korea, was a ground-oriented exception to the overall maritime
oriented U.S. strategy in the Pacific. It reinforced in the popular
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consciousness the wisdom that the U.S. should avoid ground wars in
Asia. This lesson became embedded in the so-called "Vietnam
syndrome" and appears to have outlived that syndrome, assuming
those inhibitions actually died during the Persian Gulf War. These
two Asian wars clearly involved the U.S. Navy in major ways, but
they remained on-shore exceptions to what was supposed to have
been an offshore-focused U.S. military presence in the Pacific. This
focus made the Pacific radically different from the Atlantic as a
theater for U.S. forces. Despite pockets of continentalism and
jointness, it has been throughout the postwar years a realm where
seapower was preeminent. It is no accident that the U.S.
Commander in the Pacific, CINCPAC, always is an admiral.
The cold war's history in the Asia-Pacific region therefore is
distinctly different than in Europe. Not only were the strategic and
alliance conditions radically different, in Europe it stayed 'cold' while
Asia turned 'hot' twice in major ways. Had Europe ever faced the
equivalent of a 'Korea' or a 'Vietnam,' there is every reason to
believe that the U.S. Army-oriented command structure within
NATO would have remained intact and waged that hypothetical
war. In the Pacific, however, neither of the two wars which occurred
within the overarching context of the cold war were kept within the
confines of a maritime-orientation. Although the U.S. preferred to
rely on mobile seapower, circumstances compelled it to transfer
land-based forces to the region to fight another sort of war. Had
European equivalents to Korea and Vietnam occurred, they almost
certainly would have entailed significant sea battles too. In Asia,
however, none of the cold war adversaries confronted on the
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battlefield by Americans were naval powers worthy of the name.
Hence, while the U.S. Navy controlled the "American Lake," that
ability to exercise seapower was not a truly major concern for either
Pyongyang or Hanoi. Their dependence upon the oceans militarily
and logistically was minimal. Faced with that constraint, there was
no way for American leaders to compel the enemy to fight on the
maritime terms the U.S. preferred. While this meant the United
States dominated the seas, it also meant it could not readily turn that
asset to its advantage.
Consequently, the American preference for reliance on
seapower in the Pacific was exposed as having two clear facets.
When seapower was configured in support of the projection of land-
based ground and air power, the track record was not very good.
One effort produced a stalemate. The other effort produced defeat
for the United States' ally, a severe setback for U.S. prestige, and —
arguably — the most traumatic episode in the history of U.S. foreign
and defense policy. In their wake, there was little readiness to
reengage in another Asian land war spin-off from the United States'
maritime-based commitments to the region. Aside from the
maintenance of ground-based (Army and Air Force) commitments to
maintaining the form of peninsular deterrence that emerged in
Korea from the mid-1950s to date, which was undergirded primarily
by nuclear power rather than seapower (although the latter
contributed to the former), the United States shied away from the
prospect of yet another ground war spin-off in Asia. That prospect
was never disavowed, nor could it have been for fear that the overall
maritime strategy would be seen as having a major loophole, but
32
there was no enthusiasm for a third U.S. ground war in Asia during
the cold war. By avoiding that alternative, U.S. strategy in the
Pacific revealed an emphasis on maritime deterrence but in an
environment in which the United States was unlikely to be
challenged at sea. Therefore, U.S. naval deterrence during that
period must be judged relatively passive.
Cold War Climax
These developments led to, in turn, two pronounced shifts in
U.S. maritime strategy in the Pacific. The most publicized was the
shift late in the cold war toward the development of "The Maritime
Strategy" (as contrasted with the generic label used in this analysis)
under the leadership of President Reagan and his first Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman. This approach to naval strategy was
extremely controversial because it seemed to put the U.S. Navy on a
pedestal versus the other services and because it was very
confrontational vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.21 It did both, but each
requires some explanation. That strategy was simultaneously a
device to refocus the consciousness of U.S. Naval officers on the
special roles and missions the navy fulfilled and a way to coordinate
those tasks globally against the Soviet Union's cold war threat. It
succeeded on both counts, but aroused envy because of its naval
boosterism and fear because it seemed to engage in brinksmanship
tactics. For the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, its impact was more acute.
Through its boosterism it greatly helped to revive morale that had
sagged after the Vietnam debacle. Moreover, by focusing on what
was then perceived as a growing Soviet naval menace, in the form of
the USSR Pacific Fleet's blue water capabilities, it also gave the U.S.
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Navy something it had not truly possessed in the Pacific previously,
namely a genuine naval adversary.
Before the Soviet Pacific Fleet grew into a serious rival at
sea,22 the U.S. Navy had primarily served preemptive functions
during the 1950s, '60s, and most of the 70s. By the late 1970s and
throughout most of the 1980s, the American Navy finally faced in the
Pacific a potential foe comparable to that which it had long faced in
the Atlantic. Although this was a setback in terms of the global
balance of power between the superpowers that signalled the
growth of Soviet power in what had been an American Lake, and
was not sought by the U.S. Navy, once it had occurred the U.S. Navy
clearly maximized the opportunities presented by the appearance of
a real foe. The U.S. Navy in the Pacific was no longer just a peace
keeping element in deterrence (as important as that was), it now
could justifiably claim to be preparing for a war-fighting role. This
was precisely the scenario The Maritime Strategy addressed, and
which caused so much anxiety in Asia where Asians feared the
Reagan administration's ideas about compensatory counterstrikes
that would treat the Pacific as a corollary of the European threat
environment. The U.S. Navy in the Pacific had become a far more
active participant in this form of deterrence.23
The second pronounced shift occurred over a longer span of
time. Moreover, it has not ended the way The Maritime Strategy
did with the passing of the U.S.-Soviet cold war. In the early years
of the cold war, and during the 'hot' interludes in Korea and
Vietnam, the U.S. Navy stressed its major role as the provider of
freedom of the seas. This evolved into the Sea Lines of
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Communication (SLOC) defense doctrine. This approach was
integral to the notion of an American lake in the Pacific and was a
lineal functional descendant of the Royal Navy's role in the Pacific
and other oceans. The trouble was that this task was not very
arduous since there was not very much in the Pacific capable of
interfering with the freedom of the seas. Moreover, for years the
commerce which depended upon regional freedom of the seas, was
not tremendously important to the United States. For all of the logic
SLOC defenses had within a generic American maritime strategy for
the Pacific, it did not draw much attention in Washington.
By the late 1970s and the 1980s, however, the growth of Soviet
naval power and the emergence of the Pacific Basin as a major
trading center changed these calculations considerably. The growth
of the Soviet Fleet in the Far East, based in ports on the Sea of Japan
and Okhotsk with an outlyer in ex-U.S. facilities at Camranh Bay,
Vietnam, made the sea lane protection role more credible. The fact
that Soviet interdiction of U.S. shipping (or that of U.S. friends and
allies) would risk escalation to a much larger conflict at a time when
the Reagan-Lehman team was sending unequivocal signals about
the U.S. Navy's readiness to take on an adversary greatly mitigated
the actual danger. It thereby became part of U.S. deterrence policy
and diminished the likelihood that SLOC defense might ever be
carried out. Nonetheless, no one could be certain that freedom of the
seas would be secure without the U.S. Navy playing that role.
Moreover, at the same time that SLOC defenses were becoming
more meaningful militarily, their value to regional commerce also
grew because of the increased scope of that commerce within the
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region and between the region and various Western countries. The
latter pointedly included the United States whose global trade
patterns shifted during those years from preponderant ties with
Europe to an emphasis on Japan and the "little dragons" of Asia.
However unlikely Soviet interdiction of that trade might have been
for geopolitical reasons, its possibility could not be denied by
merchants on either side of the Pacific.
These two shifts produced a qualitative change in the U.S.
Navy's role in the Pacific. Although the Pax Americana aspects of the
Pacific as an "American Lake" had been challenged by the Soviet
Union during the second flourishing of the cold war in the early-to-
mid Reagan years, American forces -- led by the U.S. Navy in a style
it had not needed previously — rebuffed that challenge and contained
Soviet ambitions. This made the U.S. Navy in the Pacific far more of
a central player in the cold war than it had been previously. No one
at the time foresaw that this was a last gasp of the Soviet "empire,"
but the subsequent changes within the Soviet Union proved that
Moscow could not outspend or outperform the United States. It
could not sustain its challenge to the entire West. This latter aspect
of the Soviet Union's failure to prevail in the cold war is directly
related to events in the Asia-Pacific region which the U.S. Navy
helped foster. The region's prosperity is a direct consequence of the
peace and stability which the U.S. Navy provided. There is little
doubt that Moscow's will seriously faltered when it realized it not
only had to cope with the economic powerhouses of North America
and Western Europe, but also had to deal with Japan and the "new
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Japans" of Asia, which were challenging ethnically Western countries
even as they became part of an extended concept of the West.
End of the Cold War
In these terms the U.S. Navy's activities in the Pacific directly
contributed to the end of the cold war between the United States and
the Soviet Union, and its regional manifestation. The U.S. Navy
can, and does, take great pride in those contributions. It can take
equal pride in militarily sustaining East and Southeast Asia's
economic success stories. In helping to bring all this about, however,
the U.S. Navy also helped to create the post-cold war era which the
United States now confronts. The entire U.S. defense establishment
was caught off guard by the rapidity of the cold war's demise.24
Throughout the long cold war the U.S. Department of Defense
prided itself on its preparations for various threat contingencies,
ranging from small regional conflicts to thermonuclear war between
the superpowers. It took equal pride in its preparations for
maintaining deterrence so that war, especially catastrophic nuclear
war, would not break out. It did not, however, prepare itself for the
kind of peace which victory in the cold war might bring because it
seemed so unlikely to occur and, consequently, its nature could not be
predicted.
This lack of preparation for "cold war termination" was
evident in all branches of the U.S. armed forces, but was especially
acute in the U.S. Navy which was reaching its peak of the Lehman-
era boom precisely at the point the cold war started to thaw.
Arguably there may have been a causal relationship between these
events. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy was not engaged in a build-up
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in order to be prepared for the day when peace would break out.
However, thanks to the cumulative pressures of years of Western
pressures upon the Soviet-led camp of the cold war, by the mid-1980s
Moscow's ability to perpetuate its struggle began to crumble. The
Gorbachev years marked the beginning of a transition in Soviet and
world affairs whose eventual product is, as of this writing in the fall
of 1991, highly uncertain. Because of that uncertainty, and the
remote possibility it suggests of a substantial reversal of all those
factors which constitute the "end" of the cold war, some very
conservative Americans (and U.S. allies) resist the notion that the
cold war actually is over.25 That possibility is discounted here
because of the extreme difficulty of reassembling that which has been
disassembled. As the saying goes, it is easier to make an omelette
from an egg, than to reverse the process. The unification of
Germany, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, reassertion of Eastern
European independence from Moscow's influence, and drastic
weakening of the Soviet Union's internal political, economic, and
social infrastructure have created momentum which cannot be
turned back. In the wake of the failed coup in Moscow, August 1991,
the collapse of communist party instruments of power and the rise of
separate power bases in the various Republics that remain tied to a
looser quasi-Soviet system appear to have made the cold war's end
irreversible.
American responses to this European-focused set of
developments have been cautious, but innovative. A wide range of
improved U.S.-Soviet/ Russian relationships symbolize the core
responses. Facilitated by the reduced threat environment now
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perceived in Europe, in which possible Soviet or Russian aggression
is calculated in terms of years of warning time rather than days, the
United States' involvement in NATO has been adjusted accordingly.
At the DOD center of these responses is the new U.S. national
security planning strategy which contemplates radical changes in
force postures, deployments, commands, and thinking about
contingencies. Most of this new thinking in DOD has emphasized
Europe and the Soviet Union. Relatively little explicit attention has
been paid to Asia in that context. Consequently, it is worth assessing
the relevance of the new U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific region
prior to evaluating how it, and the post-cold war era, will affect the
U.S. Navy in the Pacific during the coming years.26
A New American Strategy In Asia?
American strategy in Asia is on the verge of being transformed
by larger global trends. The superpowers were understandably
relieved by the end of the cold war in Europe. Political and economic
changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which produced the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact mean that NATO no longer need fear
bloc armor sundering the Central Front. That front no longer exists.
It has gone the way of the Berlin Wall. In its wake, American
officials, who prudently rely on the axiom that one must focus on an
adversary's armed capabilities to inflict harm upon the United States
rather than its intentions, now generally conclude that the Soviet
Union's dramatic decline and transformation makes it far less
dangerous. The failure of a coup in Moscow by hardliners in August
1991, which greatly enhanced domestic reformist tendencies,
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reinforced reduced American threat perceptions. This has enormous
consequences for U.S.-Asian relations. Responding to these
dramatic geopolitical shifts, the United States is undertaking
profound military reassessments. America is enroute to employing a
"reconstitution" element in its long term planning strategy to
prepare for a global war originating in Europe. However,
Washington now assumes that such a war is unlikely and it no longer
determines the U.S. force structure largely on the basis of a Soviet
threat. Instead, it plans for uncertain regional contingencies. This
approach is accompanied by new concepts of recalibrated base"
forces for various regions of the world.
It is a nascent strategic concept, emphasizing a broader
definition of national security within a more flexible framework of
reciprocal collective security, to be used selectively as contingencies
warrant. Echoing the United States' strategic drawdown between
the First and Second World Wars, while retaining a sense of global
leadership commensurate with the nuclear age, the strategic concept
as now contemplated is most striking vis-a-vis Europe where major
force reductions are certain. Despite its European emphasis, the
new strategy also calls for preliminary modest changes in the United
States' force posture in the Pacific region's base force. It builds upon
the Bush administration's first incremental reductions in U.S. ground
and air forces in the Western Pacific.27
Although many in Europe are apprehensive that the new U.S.
strategy, which changes the level of American forward deployed
forces in Europe more than it does in Asia, is a further step in a U.S.
shift toward a Pacific Century-oriented worldview, there is no
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evidence to substantiate their fears. Rather than indicating any new
focus on Asia, the relative emphasis on the Pacific which is produced
by the greater cuts in Europe reflects two short-term phenomena.
First, there is an unwarranted sense among American military and
diplomatic officials in the Asia-Pacific region that the cold war's end
does not apply to this region as thoroughly. Despite pockets of cold
war holdouts in Asia, this is a false overall perception which will be
adjusted as reality sets in. Secondly, and most important for
Europeans to understand, virtually all U.S. decisionmakers are
Atlanticists whose entire working lives have been devoted to NATO-
and EC-oriented affairs, focusing on the cold war threats from the
Soviet Union. They have paid scant attention to the Asia-Pacific
region, treating it as a corollary of U.S. global policy that can be
readily adapted to policy changes made regarding the European-
Soviet region.
In the new U.S. strategy Washington has followed these long-
standing priorities again. Actions are being taken globally that affect
the Asia-Pacific area, but not because of that region. There is no
evidence that visions of a "Pacific Century" motivated any changes in
overall U.S. strategy. Only as the imbalances in the consequent
strategy become more evident, and as more Americans also come to
terms with the end of Asia's cold war, will the United States make
adjustments in the Pacific that are comparable to what already is
being done in Europe. This will, of course, have major consequences
for bilateral U.S. security relations with Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines which will no longer have a Soviet focus for Americans.
Unless a surrogate threat perception can be discovered, or
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developed, it seems unlikely that any of those bilateral relationships
can remain intact.
Once the Soviet threat is removed, or vastly reduced, what
alternative threat remains? No imminent threat looms across the
region in the 1990s, except a common regional perception that North
American and European free trade zones may exclude Asian
products and pose a politico-economic 'threat' to Asians. Beyond
that, as the United States deals with Asian allies Americans are likely
to discover that there is no external threat to the Philippines,
Koreans see the Japanese as their largest potential foreign threat,
and the Japanese see potential threats from a unified Korean state
and from Russians (as distinct from 'Soviets'), neither of which are
dependent upon the existence of the cold war.
Many Asian states also are apprehensive about China's long-
term ambitions and wonder about the wisdom of American support
for a stronger China. Similarly, many Asians are concerned about
Japan's long term ability to convert its economic influence into
political and military power and, as a corollary, about the United
States' ability to control that process. Furthermore, Asians are
increasingly concerned about India's strategic ambitions and about
signs of intra-Asian arms races. For Americans, however, the most
important point about these security issues is that they are not part
of the cold war. Nonetheless, rather than dwell on these post-cold
war circumstances, most Asians prefer to keep the focus on the
remnants of a Russian threat which is easier to sell to Americans. In
this context, any attempt to perpetuate U.S. bilateral security
treaties in the Pacific after the region's version of the cold war
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eventually is put to rest, will require Americans to face a far more
difficult challenge than they do in Europe as they try to redefine for
domestic U.S. consumption why remaining security commitments
should be kept intact.
Asian Reactions
Asia has reacted cautiously and prudently to the modest
changes for U.S. forces in the Pacific announced by the Bush
administration in 1990-91. There is no sign that any Asian country
fully appreciates how those changes are linked to the larger strategic
shift being contemplated. There is virtually no indication that Asian
defense specialists are aware that the new U.S. national security
strategy has any direct relevance for their part of the world.28 it is
universally seen as a US-USSR and NATO-oriented issue. Regular
reassurances to Asia by senior U.S. State and Defense Department
officials, that the United States will remain a constant and reliable
factor in their security system,29 apparently have been accepted at
face value. If there are serious doubts, and there probably are —
given past U.S. inconsistencies that alarmed Asians -- they are not
being expressed. Asians seem to prefer to let "sleeping [American]
dogs lie." Rather than ask profound questions whose adverse
answers they suspect are entirely predictable, and which they do not
want to hear, Asians are not raising the issue.
Compounding this sense of caution and guarded confidence
that the United States will not make truly major revisions to its post-
cold war strategy as it applies to them, Asians tend to see the U.S.
military action in the Persian Gulf War as a clear signal that
Americans will not change their behavior. They are relieved by the
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willingness of the United States, its leaders and masses, to
perpetuate President Kennedy's readiness to "pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to
assure the survival and the success of liberty." This eagerness to be
the leader, even at a high cost, reassures Asians greatly. It also
surprises them greatly because they also see the United States as a
superpower with economic feet of clay. In short, Asians -- even as
they praise the United States and act as cheerleaders, and sometimes
bankers, for the American cause — wonder how long such
disproportionate arrangements can last. They fear the United States
will fall victim to the daunting problems outlined by another
Kennedy — Paul Kennedy of Yale.30 So, even as Asians welcome
what the United States says and hope that nothing fundamental will
change in U.S. strategy for the Pacific, they also sense that there will
be changes beyond the ability of Americans to control. Nonetheless,
they do not yet connect this dynamic process to the evolving new
U.S. strategy's relevance for Asia.
Instead, Asians are preoccupied by serious and growing
frictions in U.S.-Asian economic relations. These are prominent in
U.S. relations with Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and -- to a
lesser extent — various states in Southeast Asia. They loom far
larger to Asia than contemporary concerns over military affairs. The
best evidence of this is the cool Asian -- especially Japanese ~
responses to U.S. pressures for coalition assistance during the
Persian Gulf crisis. No prominent leader of a major state in Asia
viewed that crisis from a perspective even approximating
Washington's position. Cooperation was grudging at best. Japan
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eventually rallied around the cause, but only under political duress.
South Korea helped out, too, but minimally, belatedly, and with little
enthusiasm. The PRC did virtually nothing to help the Desert Storm
cause, and its arms sales contributed to the problem. Southeast
Asians were asked to do nothing, and they were more than happy to
oblige.
Asian leaders — notably in Japan -- resented the notion that
American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make
decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a
broadly defined western world (including the advanced economies of
Asia). Still more grating was that, having taken these steps,
Washington had the gall to twist their arms in pursuit of
burdensharing funds, especially Japanese yen. None of this sat well
with Asian leaders, who generally empathized with the reluctant
Japanese. That some responded as forthcomingly as they did and, in
the Japanese case, a double digit Sbillion range, had little relevance
to any sense that they were genuine partners with the United States
in a global coalition against distant aggression. Overwhelmingly,
Asians cooperated rhetorically and financially, albeit reluctantly, to
keep Americans off their backs and to help deflect further U.S.
criticism of Asian trade practices. In effect, Asians were engaging in
political and economic deterrence versus the United States,
postponing a while longer the day of reckoning.31
This behavior points out clearly the ways in which Asians are
preoccupied by their tense economic relations with the United States.
Their major goals are to placate Americans, to keep tensions
manageable, and to keep frictions from so frustrating Americans that
45
the United States could react adversely by retaliating through a
trade war or reducing its security commitments in Asia. These
would, in turn, compel Asians to deal autonomously and at much
higher cost with their own defenses. This behavior exemplifies the
ways in which most Asians hew to a broader and self-centered
interpretation of their national security than Americans do regarding
the United States. It also highlights why most Asians were relieved
that the burdensharing spasm during the Persian Gulf crisis was
focused almost exclusively on U.S.-Japan ties, thereby letting most
Asians (especially Chinese and Koreans, who were no more
enthusiastic than the Japanese) off the hook.
On balance, U.S. promises of strategic continuity in Asia,
apparent American willingness to police the Asia-Pacific region
despite disavowals of any desire to play the role, American hubris
over unipolar victory in the cold war, and a perverse underlying
sense that the United States' "feet of clay" gives Asia's most
advanced states a quiet long term advantage that has not yet
dawned on many Americans, collectively please Asians. They feel
comfortable that events are going their way, that the United States
will preserve the essential status quo for the next several years, and
that enough remnants of the cold war persist in Asia, despite U.S.
and Soviet efforts to defuse them, to keep the United States from
applying any new strategy to Asia. Asians tend to feel that their
region will not, and should not, be influenced as much as Europe by a
new post-cold war world order. This, in turn, raises serious
questions about how Americans might deal with Asians in this
context.
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End of Asia's Cold War
The reason more drastic changes in this theater have not yet
been made, by applying the new strategy as vigorously in Asia as in
Europe, is that the cold war has not completely ended in Asia. Some
observers, notably former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,^^
feel that Asia's cold war is fully over. American officials are, of
course, well aware that the global cold war is over, but their actions
regarding Asia suggest lingering ambiguity. Statements from the
center of the U.S. Government indicate that key officials want to
apply post-cold war thinking to Asia. Similarly, examples in 1990
such as the DOD "East Asian Strategic Initiative" and the
"President's Report [to the Congress] on the U.S. Military Presence
in East Asia" indicate that they are putting such thought into action.
Nevertheless, all these examples of forward thinking retain an
emphasis on residual regional cold war era confrontation that are
now cited as instances of strategic contingencies which the United
States must be prepared to address. Furthermore, despite such
marginal progress in a lingering cold war milieu, many American
offficials on the scene in Asia are much less flexible and responsive to
change. In part this gap may simply be bureaucratic inertia. It seems
more purposeful, however, in that institutional conservatism --
especially within the U.S. armed forces -- leads many in the field to
drag their heels in adjusting to new circumstances. To be blunt, there
is a widespread view in the field and at sea that senior Pentagon and
civilian agency officials are being precipitous in their adaptation to
global geopolitical change. As a consequence, there is a tangible
sentiment, expressed in private, that the people in the field are best
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served by waiting out the latest cycle of policy innovators. In short,
they have adopted an attitude that "this, too, shall pass." All signs
indicate that they are wrong, but the net result is sluggish acceptance
of the impact upon Asia of the end of the global cold war.
Has Asia's cold war ended? To answer that fundamental
question, upon which much of a still evolving U.S. strategy will be
based, requires that Americans, Asians, and Russians agree about
what the "Asian cold war" really is and the nature of remaining
threats. Though this may seem self-evident, it is not. There are two
fundamental choices. One can assume remnants of Asia's cold war
are so persistent that the new strategy need not be applied as
vigorously as it will be in Europe (which is the U.S. assumption
because U.S. forces and commands in the Asia-Pacific region are
changing far less than in the Euro-Atlantic region) or one can
demonstrate why it should be applied to this region as well because
its version of the cold war either has ended or will soon end. To
make the latter case requires that the "end" of Asia's cold war also be
proven.
To sustain this proposition, it must be recognized that Asia's
cold war has always differed from Europe's. In Europe, where the
United States and its cold war allies shared common threat
perceptions, there was one front line, one prime adversary, one ring
of satellites in orbit around the Soviet center, and a joint security
institution - NATO — through which the cold war was waged. Asia
possessed none of these. Its version of the cold war was qualitatively
different. Its cold war threat perceptions have been extraordinarily
diverse. No two Asian states associated with the United States saw
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the Soviet adversary in the same light. Most Asian participants in
the cold war lacked a real front line or the strategic mentality such a
barrier fosters. Korea's DMZ-arrayed deterrence stalemate is the
clearest exception. Vietnam was a partial exception, though the
front line in its war with the United States was amorphous. Hence,
none of Asia's cold warriors perceived the other's equivalent of a
front line in a manner suggesting a shared strategic vision.
The relatively weak indigenous ideological quotient of Asia's
cold war, when coupled with a dual Soviet and Chinese focus of
communist power, despite occasional shrill ideological rhetoric
between Asia's divided nations, diluted the sense of "us versus them."
Asia never developed cohesive rival ideological blocs comparable to
those in Europe. The Sino-Soviet split further obscured the
alienation regarding "them." Which them? Which us? The same
phenomena muddied the notion of proxy or surrogate states within
an adversary's bloc. Whom did Hanoi and Pyongyang heed?
Conversely, whom did Seoul, Taipei, or Saigon heed? When were
either side's client states acting autonomously? Because the villains
in Asia's cold war were, unlike in Europe, never as precise or
cohesive an entity to the defenders of freedom, the United States and
its allies could never construct the equivalent of NATO in the
Western Pacific, though some advocated such an institution. The
difficulty was compounded by the systemic asymmetry of Asia's cold
war camps. Again, unlike Europe, where each side possessed rough
parity in ground and naval forces, in the Asia-Pacific region the
United States and most of its friends stressed mobile maritime-based
power, embodied by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, whereas the Soviet
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Union, PRC, and states linked to them were overwhelmingly
continental powers. In short, there were enormous strategic
differences between Europe's cold war and the version that Asia
experienced.
Were it not for the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific
region, transferring U.S.-Soviet tensions to the Soviet Union's
eastern flank, it is doubtful that the area would have become a
substantial participant in the cold war. This contrasts with Europe,
where Americans and their European allies shared a sense of
common risk and destiny. In Asia the United States was the central
vehicle for transmitting cold war tensions with the Soviet Union to
the region through various bilateral treaties and less formal
relations. Simultaneously, American anti-communist ideology was
the glue bonding those bilateral ties into a loose network, with the
United States the nexus connecting disparate elements rather than
as the leader of a common cause. Furthermore, U.S.-Soviet frictions
superimposed a layer of global hostility upon existing Asian
relations, intensifying some, obscuring others, and camouflaging still
others. While some anti-communist elements in postwar Asia
enthusiastically rallied around the U.S. cause, many phenomena in
Asia's cold war did not emerge from that 'war' but had a life of their
own.
Vivid examples of these are found in Japan-Soviet relations.
Disputes over the so-called Northern Territories, several fishery
zones, and a variety of economic issues may share a cold war veneer
that remains essentially intact, despite President Gorbachev's April
1991 visit to Japan,33 but they would have existed had the cold war
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never developed. Japanese concerns about Soviet potentials for
aggression probably would also have emerged without a cold war.
More likely, they would have been confrontational for Japan because
it would not have enjoyed a defense buffer provided by the United
States. It was U.S.-Soviet hostility that wrapped the cold war
around these events, which actually stem from longstanding Russo-
Japanese cross-national relations.
Comparable examples of national apprehensions becoming
entangled in the cold war are reflected in Sino-Japanese, Japan-
North Korean, Southeast Asian-Chinese, and Indo-Pakistani
animosities. Regional concerns about intimidation by the once
ascendant Soviet empire did not differ greatly from earlier Czarist
aggression. Those concerns would have developed had the cold war
never occurred. Other shaky examples of perceived cold warrior
behavior in Asia include the patent ambiguity of North Korea and
Vietnam as proxies for either of their giant communist backers.
Sometimes they appeared to act as client states, but often they went
their own way. One could legitimately ask whether their proxydom
was more in the eye of American beholders than controlled by
America's adversaries in the cold war.
In Asia the indigenous stronghold of the cold war was the
Korean peninsula. Its division, destruction in war, and cultivation as
rival armed camps are Asia's clearest (though not precise) parallels
to the European cold war. Unlike much of Asia, Korea was divided
by an unambiguous military front line and the divided nation was
riven by an imported ideological rivalry which established deep
roots. Korea was part of the cold war's birth, matured with that era,
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and now may be on the verge of ending its conflict along with the
reduction in tension in the global cold war. Though many point to
contemporary Korea as an example of the cold war's intractability in
Asia, and a prime reason why the new U.S. strategy should not be
applied as thoroughly throughout Asia,34 the changing situation in
Korea illustrates how Asia's most extreme example of the cold war
also is thawing. Dramatic recent improvements in South Korean
relations with the Soviet Union and China rank alongside the
importance of changes in Eastern Europe. Progress in Japan-North
Korea relations also help to reduce tensions. Even U.S.-North
Korean relations are mellowing, although impeded by American
concerns about International Atomic Energy Agency oversight of
possible North Korean nuclear capabilities. If Korea's extreme
version of the cold war can be resolved over the next few years, a
real possibility now that both the United States and the Soviet Union
at long last stand ready to help, and because Pyongyang's external
support has been damaged by the upheaval in the Soviet Union, then
all else in the Asian cold war also should be manageable.
As the superpowers and other major players seek to reduce
cold war tensions in Asia, it is vital for them to recognize what is,
and what is not, meant by "the cold war." Those cross-national
tensions which stem from longstanding intra-Asian relations must be
distinguished from their cold war trappings. Washington and
Moscow must disassociate the vestiges of their cold war policies
from those earlier contexts which, throughout the cold war years,
possessed a vitality ensuring that they would have developed in any
event. Neither Washington nor Moscow should permit themselves
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to be trapped by remnants of cold war institutions, drift with the
momentum of anachronistic cold war policies, be entangled by the
inertia of stale cold war thinking, or be misled by the ghosts of cold
war animosities. Most of Asia's remaining pockets of the cold war
between the United States and whatever finally replaces the Soviet
Union can be rapidly resolved as "cold war" phenomena if
Washington and Moscow devote sufficient attention to them. Once
this is done, the new U.S. planning strategy may be applied as
thoroughly to Asia as it is to Europe.
Much can be removed from the lingering cold war
environment in Asia by simply agreeing that many of Asia's assumed
cold war problems never warranted that description. Many can be
redefined out of existence, as the United States and PRC did with the
Taiwan issue. It was effectively removed from the list of cold war
hot spots where it once seemed so prominent and relegated to an
intra-China concern. The other problems will not disappear, of
course, any more than Taiwan's place within China did as a regional
issue. Yet they too can legitimately be removed from a cold war
milieu and returned to their rightful location, into a traditional
cross-national geopolitical context. It is no longer necessary to treat
outstanding Russo-Japanese, Sino-Japanese, Japan-Korea, Indo-
Pakistani, or various Chinese-Southeast Asian disputes as lingering
parts of the cold war. Neither are any intra-national problems
necessarily linked to the cold war. Let these issues stand alone and
be dealt with by the regional parties concerned. Similarly,
Washington and Moscow no longer need perceive hostile third states
as proxies. Moreover, even their lingering hostility should be far
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more manageable by Washington, Moscow, and regional actors if
totally removed from the cold war environment. Should
Washington and Moscow choose, they could be much less sensitive to
remaining ill will from far-flung countries, since that animosity
would be redefined out of the cold war context.
Consequently, much of Asia's remaining cold war can be
disposed of quickly by redefining the areal terms of reference. If the
cold war's antagonists agree that neither is any longer a danger to
each other in Asia, the hoary axiom about capabilities versus
intentions will not sustain remnants of the cold war in Asia either.
Too many Americans are reluctant to make that assumption.
Nonetheless it is warranted because the severely weakened Soviet
economy and troubled political system, and those of its republics,
which allows the United States to revise sharply downward any
expectation of an attack in Europe, cannot sustain a more effective
military threat in far away Asia. The rapidly changing Soviet system,
behind its Asian armed capabilities, is the same deteriorating and
decrepit one behind its European capabilities. Moreover, in the Far
East it must operate at the end of vulnerable, tenuous logistical
supply lines, thereby diminishing its capabilities further. It is difficult
to understand the continuing American anxiety about Soviet military
strength in the Pacific region, especially in the form of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet, or why the Soviet Union should be considered any more
dangerous in Asia than in Europe. Even if, in a worst case situation,
one assumes the Soviet or Russian military leaders in Asia were out
of Moscow's control, they would still be hobbled by their disastrous
economy and cut off from its European heart. Any such "worst case"
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scenario must be considered a remote prospect in the wake of the
failed Moscow coup of August 1991 and the dramatic changes which
followed it. Coupling this objective reality with the improved
expressed intentions of current leaders in Moscow, the prospects for
completely ending Asia's cold war must be assessed positively. It is
time the U.S. and Soviet Union, or its successor, redefine the Asian
cold war out of existence. This will allow American defense officials
to apply the new U.S. planning strategy to both Europe and Asia
with equal thoroughness and enthusiasm.
Troubling Issues
Were the cold war's antagonists to take these positive steps,
however, two areas still would loom as particularly troublesome.
One is Korea, where a genuine Stalinist relic of the cold war persists.
The progress toward Korean tension reduction made so far should
be pursued, if possible. Just as in the superpower cold war, the
capabilities versus intentions calculations in Korea are now changing
enough to further reduce tensions. Since the singular parallels in
Korea with Europe's cold war are genuine there is reason to hope
that Europe's precedents, especially German unification and nuclear
arms control, and the good will of Washington and Moscow, can be
influential in Korea. Every effort should be made toward that end. If
it works, all concerned can rejoice and welcome a stable, peaceful,
and perhaps unified Korea to the post-cold war era. There is,
however, a real possibility that the stubborn Korean cold war may
prove uniquely resistant to change because of the uncompromising
nature of the leadership in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Each seems
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unwilling to make genuine concessions to the other that have
characterized recent Washington-Moscow relations.
If tensions persist, Washington and Moscow confront a
difficult choice. Should they allow one isolated remnant of the cold
war to entangle them indefinitely? Or should they jointly decide to
reduce their shared risk by leaving the Korean cold war to be
resolved by the two Koreas? This would be unlikely today because of
persistent American assumptions that events in Korea will affect
adjoining states with serious consequences for the remaining cold
war atmospherics in Asia. If, however, Asian regional security
concerns are effectively removed from that anachronistic context by
Washington and Moscow disassociating themselves, then Korea's
ability to disrupt its neighbors' peace and stability — though no less
real for regional states — is no longer a quasi-cold war vital issue.
The Korean cold war can legitimately be left in a vacuum for them to
resolve, as a civil war stalemated by its own entrenched bi-polar
deterrence. Their success or failure would no longer bear on U.S. or
Soviet/Russian vital interests vis-a-vis each other. Korean tensions,
as a regional issue, could then legitimately revert to priority concerns
for the peninsula's Asian neighbors, China and Japan. That Korea is,
and probably always will be, a crucial country for China and Japan
(and because of that for the Soviet Union and Russian Republic, too),
does not necessarily mean the United States must continue to assign
as high a priority to Korean affairs as it received during the cold
war. This emphatically does not mean that Americans should be
cavalier about Korea's fate. The United States has major interests
there and a moral obligation built up over many years, but neither of
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those factors warrant perpetuating cold war era security
commitments if they damage larger U.S. national interests. This
may seem a cold hearted resolution for Korea, but it is eminently
realistic for Washington and Moscow as they seek to spread the
influence of the post-cold war era. Knowing that Washington and
Moscow enjoy this viable option should add to Seoul's and
Pyongyang's incentives to make genuine compromises to end the
Korean cold war rapidly before the Korean peninsula has lust its
strategic relevance to Washington and Moscow.
Either way, Korea's stubborn perpetuation of the cold war
could, and should, be dealt with. Much less manageable is the
second problem. There will remain an overarching disparity
between Asia and the symmetry of U.S.-Soviet tension reduction in
the Atlantic-European realm, where comparable cuts can be
negotiated on both sides of their armed balance. The differences in
continental versus maritime power are not so glaring there and can
be easily accommodated. Naval power can remain in rough parity,
while ground-based forces are cut significantly. In the Asia-Pacific
region, however, trade-offs are extraordinarily difficult between
Soviet and Russian continental power and U.S. maritime power.35
This is evident globally in the U.S. reluctance to negotiate
significant naval arms control36 and in its new strategy which will
allow large ground-based armed forces to be demobilized or put in
reserves to await unknown contingencies. In part, this reflects the
inherent personnel and industrial difficulties in reconstituting naval
forces which have been demobilized or mothballed, even with the
two year advance warning time the new strategy assumes for
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reconstituting American capabilities against a revived threat from
the Soviet Union. Equally important to the United States, however,
is the justifiable perception that it remains more dependent upon
maritime power in a sharply reduced threat environment than any
future major adversary, including a revitalized Soviet threat. So,
even as the cold war is terminated worldwide, the major powers
must simultaneously agree upon mutual acceptance of differing
military (ground and air forces) versus naval emphases in how to
preserve their post-cold war national security. In other words, the
existence of large Soviet or Russian ground-based armed forces in
Asia should be considered by Americans to be 'natural' and a quid pro
quo for Moscow's acceptance of large U.S. naval forces in the
Pacific. Each's disproportionate scale compared to the other's
resources in that defense sector should be accepted as a routine
expression of the legitimate national security establishment of a
continental power versus a maritime power. This step, which should
be implemented by a Pacific version of the U.S.-USSR Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Europe, is essential to
end Asia's cold war completely and allow smooth implementation of
the United States' new planning strategy.
Examples of Asian circumstances that might be influenced by
the new U.S. strategy and, in turn, might influence that strategy, are
numerous. When asked about the likelihood of war in the wake of
the reduced Soviet threat, General Powell (Chairman of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff) told the Washington Post "Haven't the foggiest.
I don't know. That's the whole point. We don't know like we used to
know."37 American thoughts about hypothetical contingencies for
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which U.S. forces should be prepared are outlined in the 1991
UNCLASSIFIED Joint Military Net Assessment. The major
contingency it envisions in Asia concerns Korea. This contingency
and those of lesser probability, are to be handled by existing U.S.
forces in the region, pre-positioned equipment available to mobile
forces, and with the cooperation of allies in the region. All these
elements are products of the cold war years, made relatively less
certain and reliable by the post-cold war era.
If the United States and Soviet Union, or its successor, actually
redefine the Asian cold war totally out of existence, some rationales
for U.S. and allied forces being located where they are in the Pacific
region, and their existing tasks, would be dissipated. Furthermore,
efforts at arms control and tension reduction within Asia (i.e.,
between the two Koreas and China-Taiwan) also could change the
ground rules. Equally important, the expectations of Asian friends
and allies about how they might be expected to cooperate with the
United States (never a dependable variable even at the height of the
cold war) is made more uncertain by the rapidly changing
international environment. As a consequence, future American
decisions about force structure, deployments, basing requirements,
and command arrangements should be predicated on evolutionary
reality in the Asia-Pacific region — not on anachronistic or static
perceptions. American officials clearly think they are moving in that
direction now, but ~ to the extent they are -- they are being
hampered by remnants of the cold war and foot dragging by
Americans on the scene in Asia.
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Certain issues will be relatively narrow in their focus on the
American defense bureaucracy such as the size and scope of a
revamped U.S. Pacific Command, or ~ even more narrowly — how
the unique U.S. Army command linkages from Korea to Washington
will be adapted to the future shape of the Pacific Command. Broader
issues such as the utility and availability of bases in the Philippines,
Korea, and Japan, the nature of binational commands such as the
Combined Forces Command in Korea, the willingness of Asian
nationalists to yield to American strategic desires, and the growth of
indigenous military power centers in Asia (i.e., China, Japan, and
India) that might partially displace U.S. military power, collectively
will shape whatever post-cold war Asia that evolves from assertive
U.S. and Soviet efforts to end completely Asia's cold war. Perhaps
most important, these factors will raise serious questions about the
long-term viability of existing U.S. security treaties in the region.
The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in particular, will be subjected to
pressure to adapt to the new circumstances.
Post-Cold War Prospects
The United States and the Soviet Union must also mesh this
still uncertain process with the reality that the end of Asia's cold war
will remove the veneer of superpower constraints on longstanding
underlying regional tensions, as happened in Europe. Removal of
the geopolitical cork from the Asian strategic bottle may be more
acute than comparable European developments because Asia's
internal differences throughout the postwar period have remained
more diverse than Europe's. Furthermore, if Europeans are anxious
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about adjusting to the U.S. strategic approach to their part of the
world, and are nervously trying to discourage Americans from
reducing their armed presence in Europe below the two divisions to
be retained within NATO, one can imagine the consternation Asian
leaders will experience over the next few years if the new planning
strategy's impact is felt as acutely in the Pacific as in Europe. The
post-cold war Asia-Pacific region will be both more complex
strategically and less well positioned than Europe to foster a political
surrogate for former military institutions. The lack of a NATO-like
structure in the Asia-Pacific area prohibits the relatively simple
conversion process envisaged by Europeans. This difference
between the regions is compounded by the momentum toward
enhanced EC unity after 1992, which may eventually absorb Eastern
Europe and Russia. This would mitigate the underlying European
tensions exposed by the removal of NATO-Warsaw Pact constraints.
The Asianization of Asia's regional security likely to emerge in its
post-cold war era holds little promise of unity of purpose or shared
aspirations.
On balance, however, the resurfacing of endemic regional
tensions in Asia may be inevitable and ultimately healthy. Its
prospect is no reason to perpetuate an artificial cold war
environment to prevent unleashing repressed dynamics. The
argument which some Americans make, that the U.S. must remain as
a stabilizing force to prevent excessively powerful Asian states from
disrupting the equilibrium, is a relic of the cold war. There is no need
for the U.S. to be a policeman for the region, self-appointed or
elected by default. Asian-Pacific dynamics should be unleashed to be
61
dealt with by regional actors. As this occurs, moreover, all concerned
— but especially the United States and whatever remains of the
Soviet Union ~ should reconsider whether cold war era alliances,
overtaken by events, still make sense for post-cold war states. They
could be retained intact if Washington or Moscow want to maintain
a commitment to a given Asian country to defend it against its
aggressive neighbors, for reasons that have nothing to do with the
cold war motives which led to the original commitments. Those
motives were made obsolescent by the end of the superpower cold
war and by the resurfacing of regional tensions among states
capable of dealing with each other without external assistance. The
United States and the Soviet Union will be free to retain existing
bilateral security relationships in the region, if they can devise
political rationales palatable to their respective publics. Similarly,
each may wish to play a stabilizing role in the region's security.
American officials often speak of doing so in the form of a so-called
"balance wheel" for Asian security.38 in the American case, pursuing
this option is likely to be rough where Asian economic power and
political nationalism are on the rise.
In the post-cold war era there are substantial reasons why such
increasingly anachronistic bilateral and regional arrangements
should be reconsidered by American and Soviet/Russian
decisionmakers. Applying the new U.S. planning strategy to the
Asian-Pacific region as thoroughly as it is to Europe would facilitate
such reappraisals, based on post-cold war U.S. interests in the area.
This does not imply that either the United States or the Soviet
Union/ Russian Republic are likely soon to forego their status as
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Pacific powers. American leaders note frequently that the United
States intends to maintain a presence in Pacific affairs regardless of
the Soviet Union's role. The same view is as legitimately expressed
by Soviet and Russian leaders. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union, or the Russian Republic, are Pacific states with valid national
interests in the region and are likely to remain major factors long
after the Asian cold war has utterly melted. If the total dissolution of
the Soviet Union actually occurs, the Rusian Republic would remain
as a key actor in Pacific security affairs. However, both countries are
likely to be sharply constrained post-cold war powers in a
dramatically altered strategic context. Their adjustment to the new
context promises significant changes in the ways they pursue their
interests, with greater emphasis on economic issues than on the
military issues which dominated the cold war years. As this unfolds
throughout the 1990s, Asia, too, must adjust to, and help shape, the
new world order.
In this context the new U.S. strategic approach can, and
should, be as vigorously applied to Asia as to Europe. Asia like
Europe epitomizes the new security environment that the revamped
American planning strategy is designed to address: a dramatically
diminished Soviet/Russian threat; far less prominent regional
military threats which economically powerful local allies are
competent to handle despite minimal or no U.S. assistance; and —
most important — growing regional economic 'threats' which are a
direct challenge to post-cold war U.S. national interests.
Consequently, applying the new U.S. planning strategy to Asia as
thoroughly as it is being applied to Europe should not be avoided by
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Americans for archaic, cold war vintage reasons. Though Asian
security partners of the United States are no more likely than its
European partners to welcome the dramatic shift in American
strategic priorities, that should not deter Americans from applying
the new strategy to both major regions in a spirit of parity. It is time
to apply the new strategy universally, and move on to a more
innovative U.S. policy for Asia that is capable of redressing the many
economic issues which confront Americans in the region.
Post-Cold War Issues
As the United States confronts the post-cold war era in Asia,
Washington also will be confronted with four key issues which raise
questions about how best to utilize the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. At
the same time as the post-cold war era sharply reduces (and perhaps
eliminates) the United States' ideological reasons for being
committed to the defense of various allies and to sustaining an
environment of freedom in which anti-communist states can
flourish, Americans also will have to come to terms with the ways in
which cold war era allies have transformed themselves into
economic competitors whose rivalry with the United States will
shape the nature of the post-cold war years.39 This transformation
already is helping to change the geopolitical framework of the
victorious Western camp of the former cold war.
Trading Blocs The prospective emergence of trading blocs in
the European Community (EC) post-1992 and in the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a defensive mechanism
for coping with the economic challenges posed by Asian-Pacific
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states. In turn, the economic leaders of Asia nervously perceive the
EC and NAFTA groupings as potential exclusionary devices which
should motivate Asians to consider creating their own forms of
regional economic groupings.40 This is a profound development
which could shake the foundation of U.S.-guided security systems in
the Asia-Pacific region to their roots. After all, one must question the
willingness of the American people and the U.S. Congress to provide
(and pay for) the lion's share of the wherewithal for Western Pacific
security and stability if they primarily serve the interests of a rival
trading bloc. Whether or not such trading blocs reach full fruition
remains to be seen. In either event, three other trends also are
evident.
Asian Power Centers Due partly to Asian perceptions that the
United States is retrenching in the Western Pacific, but mainly
because of increased Asian nationalism, confidence, and pride, the
Asia-Pacific region is witnessing the growth of indigenous centers of
power. China, Japan, and India are enroute to reasserting their
traditional preeminence that had been temporarily overshadowed by
the United States' disproportionate clout in the post-Second World
War/cold war years.
China and India remain today what they long have been: huge
centers of relatively autonomous civilization. Their existence defines
and helps shape what are known as the Sinic and Indie cultural
realms. In these terms they remain cultural poles in the
contemporary world. Building upon that legacy of greatness,
however, both China and India are bent upon reviving the political,
economic, and military influence they formerly wielded. Though
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each has a long road ahead of it, both possess certitude about the
historical inevitability of their cyclical return to power. The
domination of Western powers over the past century and a half is not
a unique phenomenon. Both China and India had been subjugated by
foreigners before only to rebound as strong as previously. In short,
these are resilient civilizations prepared for the long haul.
In Japan's case, the resurgence of power has a shorter memory,
but -- perversely ~ a more acute one. Unlike the Chinese and
Indians whose leaders and elders have never tasted truly great
international power in their lifetimes, or the living memory of their
immediate ancestors, the Japanese were at the apex of their
international geopolitical power barely half a century ago. Although
few Japanese today thirst for that form of power again, many in
contemporary Japan do have ambitions for more international
power than is possible as the junior partner of the United States.
Therefore, the Japanese quest for power is qualitatively different
from that of China and India. It lacks the historical transcendental
qualities of the Sinic and Indie centers, but it compensates for that
absence with a stress on the real economic power Japan already
possesses, which makes Tokyo the natural leader of any nascent
trading bloc in the region.
The key nuance for the post-cold war era that concerns both
the region, and outsiders with interests in the region, is how China,
India, and Japan might try to cultivate greater power and influence
in the Asia-Pacific region. What combination of economic, political,
and military means will they use? Which possess advantages in each
sector? Which is the most ambitious; the most adventurous? In the
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foreseeable future, the odds seem stacked in Japan's favor. It has the
greatest human, financial, and technological advantages, and the
fewest disadvantages. Japan's armed forces, especially its 'navy'
(i.e., the Maritime Self-Defense Force), are significant strategic
actors which are widely recognized as such in the region.41
Moreover, despite Japan's pacifist image, there is an undercurrent of
enthusiasm for things military and naval in Japanese society. This
was well illustrated by the popularity of "Captain Shiro Kaieda," a
Manga character whose naval exploits in The Silent Service against
the U.S. Seventh Fleet, caught the Japanese masses' attention in
1990-91.^2 However, Tokyo also is the most cautious of the lot. It
remembers the costs of past recklessness, fears its own potentials,
and is the least certain that it has a right to be a power in the region
again. In short, Japanese ambiguity hampers Tokyo's prospects.
Moreover, the "foreseeable future" may be the wrong framework for
analyzing Asia's potentials. It is precisely the unforeseen processes
of cyclical historical patterns which reassure Chinese and Indians
that their time shall come again.
Asian Arms Races These ruminations cannot directly help
contemporary American policymakers make decisions about how the
United States should cope with the post-cold war era in Asia.
Nonetheless, they must be borne in mind as Americans react to
contemporary strategic developments in Asia that are independent
of the cold war. Within this third key issue, there are two major
military developments that bear close watching. One concerns the
three countries just assessed, and bears directly on the U.S. Navy's
future presence in the Pacific and adjacent waters. Although China
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and India remain today what they traditionally have been -- namely
continental powers -- each also is devoting new emphasis to the
naval components of its military. The People's Republic of China is
determined to hold its own at sea in the region, develop a navy
which will deter naval intimidation by any other power (i.e., a
coastal version of freedom of the seas), and be a player in any future
negotiations for regional security or arms control.43 India's naval
ambitions once appeared to be more substantial. Although it had a
long way to go, India -- despite disavowals of great power
ambitions ~ appeared to be developing a navy capable of
dominating South Asian waters and making its presence felt
throughout the Indian Ocean. For New Delhi this seemed to be a
way to pursue its goals of preserving non-alignment even as the
post-cold war era has made alignment with superpower camps
passe, preventing any outside power from exerting undue influence
in regions contiguous to the ocean which bears India's name, and
reasserting in a subtle way the age-old relationship that the sub-
continent had with areas as diverse as Southeast Asia, Southwest
Asia, and East Africa. The end of the cold war exerted a subtle
influence upon India's naval ambitions. Without the support of the
Soviet Union internationally, with no aligned system in which to
pursue non-alignment, and faced with daunting economic problems,
India by mid-1991 had essentially shelved its more elaborate hopes
for a significant blue water navy.44
Although India's ability to rival militarily the great powers of
the world on their turf or seas always was judged limited at best,
that is not true in its own backyard. There is every likelihood that
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India, if it can cope with domestic, ethnic, and political centrifugal
forces that threaten it with disunion, will be able to assert regional
primacy in the coming years. This still causes some anxiety among
India's immediate neighbors who are apprehensive about the scope
of India's long term ambitions regarding the traditional domain of
"India." Similarly, countries further afield, such as the ASEAN states
and Australia, are nervous about India's long term potential should
they be realized in regional circumstances in which other major
powers adopt lassez faire strategic attitudes.45
Partly in response to these potentials, but also in response to a
combination of hypothetical scenarios that include growing Chinese
and Japanese military power and a (relatively) declining U.S.
military presence in the Western Pacific, the post-cold war era in Asia
is notable for the persistence of intra-regional arms races. This is
most striking in Southeast Asia where it is picking up speed.46
Southeast Asians sense the emergence of a power vacuum caused by
lessened superpower interest in preserving the cold war military
status quo which was overtaken by events. Even during the depths
of the cold war, Southeast Asian states (especially within SEATO
and ASEAN) sought to maintain a rough equilibrium based on East-
West rivalries which would, in turn, help prevent Asian major
powers (China, Japan, and India) from exerting control in the
region. Changes in this calculus caused by the end of the cold war,
makes the presence of Asian giants felt far more than previously.
Consequently, contemporary Southeast Asian states are increasingly
concerned about strategic pressures from East and South Asia.47
This causes them to increase their preparedness militarily, politically,
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and economically. Because most of these states operate in a
maritime environment, they naturally include a naval buildup as part
of their increased preparedness. None, however, loom large in this
regard. By engaging in a build-up, however, the uneven capabilities
of these states also stirs what might be considered intramural
geopolitical anxieties. There is concern that one or more states in the
sub-region might try to assume a leadership role. Indonesia stands
out in this regard. Consequently, the emerging arms race also helps
constrain intra-regional rivalries.
To the North, on the Korean peninsula, another arms race
persists, largely as a relic of the cold war. Though it is being
tempered somewhat by progress in the inter-Korean dialogue
brought about by the end of the superpower cold war, it also is
aggravated by other factors. There is a nascent nuclear arms race in
Korea, with terrible potentials to be disruptive regionally. In
another vein, the Korean arms race inadvertently creates conditions
in which, were Korea to be unified, the resultant Korean state might
be very heavily armed. This is a disquieting prospect for its
immediate neighbors, especially Japan. In tandem with these
developments, and echoing the PRC's desire to be a regional naval
presence, South Korea has deviated from its continental emphasis to
pursue the creation of a "blue water" navy, albeit regionally
oriented. Seoul's motives are clear. It wants to be a player in any
regional security arrangements the United States might
contemplate, wants to prevent Japan from dominating any such
arrangements, and -- more remotely -- wants to be able to deal with
Asian major powers on a broad strategic front should it ever have to
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go it alone strategically. Seoul thinks it requires a more formidable
navy to do this.48
Basing Access That Korean apprehension points to the fourth
of the key issues the United States faces in its post-cold war security
environment in Asia. That environment is in flux. As a result of
several trends: U.S. fiscal constraints, diminished U.S. anti-
communist ideological motivation, and an upsurge in nationalism in
most Asian-Pacific countries, the United States' continued access to
forward deployed bases and transiting rights is more problematic
than it ever was during the cold war years. Two events pointed the
way, one political and one geophysical. The New Zealand Labor
Party's 1985 rejection of U.S. conditions for full participation in the
ANZUS pact, that produced the virtual collapse of that leg of the
U.S. presence in the Pacific, was sustained by the conservative
National Party upon its return to power in October 1990. During the
years since 1985, the United States has been constrained in its
reliance on one portion of its Pacific alliance network. While the
ANZUS leg may not have been terribly important in substantive
ways, the symbolism of a western, English-speaking nation deciding
upon a security path which diverged from that preferred by
Washington was very important indeed.49
It sent signals throughout the Asia-Pacific region that
American policy could be challenged with relative impunity. In the
wake of the cold war, with greatly reduced threats, the Kiwis'
actions have assumed new significance because they appear to have
been presciently ahead of the times. There is little doubt that
influential figures in countries like Japan, Korea, and the ASEAN
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states now find the notion of nuclear-free zones of growing appeal.
Were, for example, the two Koreas to agree upon arms control or
confidence building programs that include nuclear-free steps, the
ramifications for U.S. basing right there would be significant unless
Washington changes its 'neither confirm nor deny' policy. So, too,
would the impact of a Korean nuclear-free decision on Japan's
vaunted "three non-nuclear principles" be tremendous. Tokyo
probably could not withstand the pressures such cumulative
developments would have upon Japan to put genuine teeth into
those principles. This, in turn, would raise serious questions about
the viability of U.S. bases in Japan. In these circumstances the U.S.
Navy would confront in Northeast Asia roughly the same sort of
constraints imposed upon its operations as it faces in New
Zealand.50
Geophysically, it was an act of nature which nudged the United
States toward a long expected basing decision in the Philippines.
The explosion of Mt. Pinatubo sealed the fate of Clark Air Base. It
also set the stage for political decisions within the Philippines that
may amount to handwriting on the wall for Subic Bay Naval Base.
The Philippine Senate's September 1991 rejection of an extension of
the U.S. lease at Subic probably sealed the base's fate, barring a
major reversal. On balance, however, the volcanic eruption only
accelerated a process which many observers of Philippine affairs
long have considered inevitable. Sooner or later, the United States
would be compelled by Philippine nationalists to withdraw its bases.
The cuts now may be on a schedule that neither side fully anticipated,
but they are nonetheless in the offing. Volcanic eruptions are unlikely
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to disrupt any other forward U.S. bases in the region, but events
which were almost as unanticipated may serve the same purpose.
The best example is in Korea. Were the two Koreas to unify
peacefully, perhaps as rapidly as Germany did, there is little prospect
that U.S. forces would retain a valid reason to stay on the peninsula.
Their removal might well be part of the package embodied by the
unification process. If not, a unified Korea would have no equivalent
of NATO to warrant the perpetuation of U.S. bases on the peninsula,
even if Korean nationalists could tolerate them under those long
awaited circumstances. In all probability, the main reason Koreans
might want to retain U.S. forces there would be to protect Korea
from Japan. That is a problematical proposition given the existing
U.S.
-Japan relationship. American bases in Japan seem more secure,
but they too are subject to the vagaries of the post-cold war era.
Without a clear focus on a joint Soviet threat, those bases are
increasingly likely to be under the same sorts of scrutiny which has
produced major drawdowns in Western Europe. That likelihood is
compounded by the persistent economic frictions between the United
States and Japan. Were trade blocs to become the framework for
international relations by the late 1990s, the handwriting almost
certainly would be on the wall for these bases too. The loss of major
bases in all three allied countries would put a severe crimp in the
style and capabilities of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific.51
Naval Consequences
In sum, therefore, the United States is faced with these four key
issues which help shape the post-cold war Asia-Pacific region: 1)
emergent blocs in a world of shifting trade patterns; 2) revival of
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traditional centers of Asian political power; 3) the growth of various
Asian military powers and arms races within the region; and 4)
problematic basing conditions. These issues are generically
important for the United States, but specifically relevant for the U.S.
Navy as the main military instrument of U.S. power in the Pacific.
Taking them in the order presented, the issue of trading blocs has
tremendous implications for the U.S. Navy. The notion of an Asian
trading bloc which partially or largely behaves in a protectionist
manner, raises direct challenges to much that the U.S. Navy has
done in the Pacific since the Second World War. Should the U.S.
Navy be used to defend the commercial sea lanes of a rival trading
bloc? Is the principle of freedom of the seas universally valid to the
extent that American ships, personnel, and tax dollars should be used
to preserve that freedom for other trading states? If the U.S.
Merchant Marine does not enjoy a major reversal of its decline, to
what extent should sea lanes be considered regions that Americans
should protect in the name of internationally defined U.S. national
interests? The answers to these questions must be offered in the
post-cold war context in which anti-communist motives no longer
rank so high in American strategic cost-benefit analyses. Similarly,
the vaunted notion of SLOC defense is dependent on trans-Pacific
free trade (or at least the quest for free trade) and on defending
strategically key waterways from Soviet encroachment. The
combination of a post-cold war strategic environment and a trading
bloc economic environment would do severe damage to the logic
behind cooperative SLOC defenses in the Western Pacific and
between that region and Southwest Asia and Europe beyond it.
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Equally important, albeit more abstract, the preeminence of
economic factors which the prospect of trading blocs crystalize raises
a profound question about the established priorities of the U.S. in
Asia. Whether blocs emerge, or free trade flourishes, the United
States is on the edge of an era in Asia in which military-first
priorities will be considered obsolete.52 As noted above, the United
States already has begun the transition to blended priorities, but by
no means has the United States returned to the policy course it once
followed in which the flag followed trade. Americans clearly
understand the interrelationships of commerce and security, but the
United States — despite occasional rhetoric from Washington to the
contrary -- still puts defense first in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moreover, Washington remains adamant that economic frictions
must not be permitted to contaminate smooth U.S. security relations
with states in the region.53 Mounting economic priorities promise
(or threaten, depending upon one's perspective) to revive older
priorities in ways that would have the U.S. Navy (i.e., the "flag")
follow commercial interests. Hence, the United States' economic
interests would play a larger role in determining what the U.S. Navy
does, and does not do, in the Pacific.
This raises a range of ways in which the U.S. Navy's role in the
Pacific might be influenced. Were rival trade blocs to flourish, as
noted, the U.S. Navy probably would not be tasked with providing
their protection. Were Asian trade challengers, in a free trade
environment, to be perceived as major economic adversaries, similar
questions about the desirability of underwriting their defense costs
would likely be raised thereby jettisoning the commitment to keeping
75
trade and security issues separate. If economic relations are
mutually beneficial, but the United States is preoccupied by
remaining competitive with post-cold war allies who also are
commercial rivals, one can readily envision an American economic
mandate which would require the U.S. Defense establishment to
maintain American security through trade-offs that maximize U.S.
economic gains rather than in terms of narrowly defined security. In
any event, all these hypothetical yet realistic circumstances would
require the U.S. Navy to be utilized in a strikingly different manner.
It would become a tool of economic policy.
The reemergence of Asian centers of political, economic, and
military power that would return the Asia-Pacific region to a form of
normalcy that has been precluded by American dominance
throughout the cold war decades would be equally significant for the
U.S. Navy because it would make it abundantly clear that the Pacific
is not considered by Asians to be an 'American Lake." The precise
distribution of Asian power would be, of course, a decisive variable.
It would make a major difference whether China, Japan, or India
opted for greater geopolitical stature and influence. Of the three,
India presumably would be least worrisome because of its lesser
potentials, recently curtailed ambitions, and because it is furthest
from areas Americans are accustomed to treating as "vital." On both
counts the reverse is true of China and Japan. China is a classic
sleeping dragon, that most Americans would prefer to let slumber -
indefinitely. Nonetheless, it could become a more effective and
assertive actor in world affairs. Fortunately its prospects are — at
best -- likely to remain regionally focused. Even so, a powerful,
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regionally assertive China would change the strategic environment
the United States has known for half a century. The most decisive
changes could emanate from Japan because it has the most
wherewithal. Japan also is the only one of the three traditional
Asian power centers which one can readily visualize aspiring to
extraregional influence. Already a global economic superpower,
Japan could try to become a world class political and military power.
In the latter sense, that would certainly mean expansion of its
already formidable "navy" (i.e., the Maritime Self-Defense Force)
into a true Navy that could rival any.
Against these scenarios, the shrinking of the portion of the
Pacific which Americans could legitimately consider the United
States' "lake" seems likely. In short, any serious growth of
indigenous centers of geopolitical power, with attendant naval
power, would recreate circumstances the likes of which the U.S.
Navy has not had to deal with during the careers of any officers on
active service. For most of its history in the Pacific the U.S. Navy
dwelt in a maritime environment made secure by another power's
forces, i.e., the Royal Navy. That changed during the 20th century,
but the U.S. Navy only had to deal actively with a power balance
between a solitary Asian major power versus the West for a
relatively few years as Imperial Japan became more aggressive. The
United States never has had to cope with multiple major indigenous
Asian naval powers. It may have to in the future. Were this to
happen, and large and medium size regional navies become more
active in fulfilling essentially the same sorts of roles which the United
States has played for years, it would require adjustments by the U.S.
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Navy. The range of options would likely include: confrontation,
cooperation in the form of surrogacy, nominal cooperation as junior
partners, genuine cooperation as equal partners, and acceptance of a
new division of areal responsibilities for Pacific security. All are
conceivable in circumstances where the United States would face one
or more indigenous great Asian powers. However, the "greater"
these powers become, the less likely they are to tolerate the status of
surrogate or junior partners. They are more likely to want to share
power as approximate equals or to carve up the Pacific into areal
zones of responsibilities. The latter two alternatives clearly would
pose the most difficult adjustment problem for the U.S. Navy.
Nonetheless, these are possibilities which cannot be ignored.
Lastly, the prospect of altered basing access in the Pacific looms
as a significant constraint. This is not likely to occur in a vacuum, but
in conjunction with one or more of the other alternatives. Changing
economic circumstances (in Asia and /or on the home front where
Congressional decisions could limit overseas bases), reduced Asian
willingness to act as hosts, and reduced threat perceptions may well
mean the U.S. Navy will be compelled to provide security for all or
parts of the Pacific in very different conditions than in 1991. Longer
logistics lines, lengthy deployments at sea, and longer response times
in a crisis are presently avoided by maintaining the existing network
of bases and intermittent access. To the extent such facilities are
unavailable, the U.S. Navy's existing roles and missions would have
to be curtailed or made more arduous to perform. Other changing
circumstances may well alter the existing mix of roles and missions,
thereby reducing the pressures to perform them from a smaller
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network of bases. If that does not occur, or U.S. authorities decide to
project force in far flung regions of the Pacific in which basing is no
longer available, it will require the U.S. Navy to put up with the
arduous conditions it prefers to avoid. Over a longer term, it would
compel the U.S. Navy to accelerate the development of naval
hardware that will allow the fleet to operate without the kind of
regional support structure it has enjoyed for most of the cold war
years.
Conclusion
It is clear that many factors could change for the U.S. Navy as
it operates in the Pacific. Perhaps the most important question to
raise in conclusion is, "Will the U.S. Navy be as important in - and to
~ the region as it has been?" The lockstep naval answer must be: "Of
course, no question about it!" However, that may not be true. A
balanced answer to that question depends on the ways in which the
concept of seapower is treated in the future. In a sense, that issue —
in turn — depends upon how states deal with the concept of
international power. If old definitions prevail and armed force
remains the bottom line of geopolitical relations between major
states, then the accepted parameters of seapower also should remain
intact. In that context one can, and should, argue that the U.S. Navy
will remain ~ at a minimum -- a key player in Pacific security affairs.
Whether it remains the key player depends overwhelmingly on the
variables outlined previously. The odds are strong, however, that
some combination of those scenarios will lead to some diminution of
the U.S. Navy's exceptionally large role. The real question is
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whether the diminution will be marginal or integral. The answer to
that question is largely dependent on: 1) American will to exert U.S.
influence, 2) whether the need for a U.S. presence persists in the
minds of Americans and Asians,54 and 3) whether future events in
the Asia-Pacific region permit the exercise of American will. In other
words, it depends upon how Americans define and pursue power.
All those intertwined variables will shape the scope of U.S.
Naval activities in the Pacific, but they will have little impact on the
disproportionate ratio of U.S. naval power to other forms of U.S.
armed force in the region. As long as the United States desires to be
a military player in the Pacific, it will have no choice but to be a naval
power in the area. The region's configuration does not permit
external actors to be anything other than a maritime power. If
anything, therefore, all those factors which suggest the United
States will become less of a military presence on the ground in the
Asia-Pacific area simultaneously suggest that the already large
preponderance of naval power will likely shift even further in favor
of the U.S. Navy. Whether the Pacific is ever again an "American
lake," becomes a shared theater, or becomes a buffer between
trading blocs, the United States military presence there will be naval.
On the other hand, if old definitions of international power do
not prevail and the emphasis on armed force is replaced by a focus on
economic leverage (as some theorists suggest), then prevailing
perceptions of seapower also will require revamping. One might
visualize a revival of Mahan's original thinking about seapower
brought up to date by infusing an appreciation of economic power
for its own sake rather than as a support for naval power and the
80
national goals it can sustain. This is conceivable, but stretches
Mahan's theories too far. It is more appropriate that the officer
corps of the U.S. Navy cultivate innovative strategists within its
own ranks in the hope that it can produce an Admiral Mahan for the
21st century. Such a thinker will not come from those who reinvent
the strategic wheel, have tunnel vision, are parochial in their blue
suit mentality, and do not appreciate the breadth of American
interests and how they change.
Just as Mahan drew some examples from the Pacific, so too
might his successor learn something from the region. As one looks
back upon the material covered here, there are several phases that
the U.S. Navy went through. Initially it was commercially driven. It
then became the flag which led the merchants during an imperial era.
Next, in a period of retrenchment that followed a major war and its
disillusioned aftermath, the U.S. Navy became the key defender of a
neutral and isolationist America. At the same time it became an arms
control pawn, useful for preserving peace through negotiations. It
then became the bulwark of wartime defense of the nation and of the
free world during the cold war. These phases are not meant to be
comprehensive, but simply highlights. Now that events in the world
seem to be leading the United States back toward a commercially
motivated foreign presence, in which the U.S. Navy may again
follow rather than lead merchant interests, it is worthwhile
speculating about the possibility of a cyclical pattern.
Others have detected other cycles in maritime and naval
history,55 but have not focused on these phases of the U.S. Navy in
the Pacific. If one observes trends in contemporary U.S. policy, many
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possibilities are evident. Two stand out, however, in the context of
the phases just cited. The post-cold war era was brought about by
arms control and confidence building processes. Also there is an
upsurge of liberal and conservative advocacy of a less interventionist
and more inward-looking foreign policy. Neither of these trends
seems to enjoy much favor among many contemporary U.S. Naval
officers. Be that as it may, should they both become dominant
themes in U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s and early 21st century,
there is a real possibility that the U.S. Navy will become drawn into
them also. A less interventionist United States^6 would require a
strong naval buffer in the next century as much as it did during the
isolationist 1920s & '30s. Similarly, although it is a taboo topic in the
U.S. Navy, in any long-term emphasis on arms control in the post-
cold war era it would be difficult to exclude naval arms control.57
These are merely intriguing straws in the wind; speculation not
prediction. Nonetheless, they bear watching because of the parallels
they suggest. If cyclical patterns do emerge, the U.S. Navy should be
prepared for them. Clearly, any future Admiral Mahan must watch
for the patterns of history that will guide his grand strategic design.
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